A table with marked price 1200 was sold to a customer for 1100. Find the rate of discount allowed on the table. ?->(Show Answer!)

1. A table with marked price 1200 was sold to a customer for 1100. Find the rate of discount allowed on the table.

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By: anil on 05 May 2019 01.55 am

Marked price = 1200 Selling price = 1100 => Discount % = $$frac{1200-1100}{1200}$$ * 100 = $$frac{100}{1200}$$ * 100 = $$frac{25}{3}$$ = 8$$frac{1}{3}$$%

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