Four horses are tethered at four corners of a square plot of side 14 m so that the adjacent horses can just reach one another. There is a small circular pond of area 20 $$m^2$$ at the centre. Find the ungrazed area. ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Four horses are tethered at four corners of a square plot of side 14 m so that the adjacent horses can just reach one another. There is a small circular pond of area 20 $$m^2$$ at the centre. Find the ungrazed area.

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By: anil on 05 May 2019 02.30 am

Length of the rope tied to each horse = 7 m.
Total area of the portion that the horses can graze = 4* $$pi 7^2$$/4 = 49$$pi$$
Area of the circular pond = 20 $$m^2$$
So, area left ungrazed = $$14^2 - 20 - 49pi m^2$$ = 22 $$m^2$$ (approx)

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