The following aspect/aspects will not come under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court A) Disputes between the Union and the States B) Disputes between two states C) Inter state water disputes D) Matters referred to Union Finance Com ?->(Show Answer!)

1. The following aspect/aspects will not come under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court A) Disputes between the Union and the States B) Disputes between two states C) Inter state water disputes D) Matters referred to Union Finance Commission

Write Comment

Comments

Tags

Show Similar Question And Answers

QA->For the first time, the Supreme Court issued contempt notice to a sitting high court judge, for levelling allegations against former judges of the Supreme Court and sitting judges of Madras High Court. Who is that sitting high court judge?....

QA->The Supreme Court has recently accepted the majority of recommendations of which committee covering wide-ranging aspects of Indian cricket at the central and state level?....

QA->Governmenton December 17, formed an inter-ministerial task force committee to look intoall the strategic aspects of Indus Water Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan. Who willbe the head of the committee?....

QA->Two states disputes over Cauvery water sharing are:....

QA->The Supreme Court Collegium headed by Chief Justice of India KG Balakrishnan has dropped the name of Karnataka High Court Justice from the list of those recommended for elevation to the Supreme Court. Name of that justice?....

MCQ->The following aspect/aspects will not come under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court A) Disputes between the Union and the States B) Disputes between two states C) Inter state water disputes D) Matters referred to Union Finance Commission....

MCQ-> Study tin following information carefully and answer the questions given below: Following are the conditions for selecting a Manager Finance in an organization. The candidate must- (i) be a graduate in any discipline with at least 50% marks. (ii) have completed Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Management with specialization in Finance with at least 65% marks (iii) have post qualification work experience of at least 4 years in the finance department of all organization. (iv) be at least 26 years and not more than 36 years as on 01.12.2011. In the case of a candidate who fulfils all the conditions except- (a) at (ii) above, but has secured at least 60% marks in post-graduate degree/diploma in management with specialization in Finance and at least 70% marks in Graduation. his/her case is to be referred to DGM - Finance (b) at (iii) above, but has post qualification work experience of at least two years as Assistant Finance Manager. his/her case is to be referred to GM-Finance. In each question below. details of one candidate are provided. You have to take one of the following courses of action based on the conditions given above and the information provided in each question and mark the number of that course of action as your answer. You are not to assume anything other than the information provided in each question. All these cases are given to you as on 01.12.2011. Mark answer (1) if the candidate is to be selected. Mark answer (2) if the data provided are inadequate to take a decision. Mark answer (3) if the candidate is not to be selected. Mark answer (4) if the case is to be referred to DGM-Finance. Mark answer (5) if the case is to be referred to GM-Finance. Now read the information provided in each question and mark your answer accordingly.Raman Sharma was born on 19th March 1981. He has been working in the finance department of an organization for the past six years. He has secured 65% marks in B.Com. and 75% marks In his post graduate degree in management with finance specialization.
....

MCQ-> Study the following information carefully and answer the questions given below: Following are the conditions for selecting Manager- Finance in an organisation: The candidate must — (i) be a graduate in any discipline with at least 50 percent marks. (ii) be a postgraduate in Management with specialisation in Finance. (iii) be at least 25 years and not more than 35 years as on 1.2.2013. (iv) have post qualification work experience of at least two years in the Accounts/Finance department of an organization (v) have secured at least 40 percent marks in the selection process. In the case of a candidate who satisfies all other criteria EXCEPT (A) at (ii) above, but has worked as Deputy Manager - Finance in an organization for at least three years, his/her case is to be referred to General Manager- Finance. (B) at (v) above, but has secured at least 70 percent marks in post graduation, his/her case is to be referred to President-Finance.In each question below, detailed information of one candidate is provided. You have to take one of the following courses of action based on the information provided and the conditions and subconditions given above and mark your answer accordingly. You are not to assume anything other than the information provided in case of each candidate. All these cases are given to you as on 1.2.2013Mark answer a: if the candidate is not to be selected. Mark answer b: if the data Provided are not adequate to take a decision. Mark answer c: if the case is to be referred to General Manager-Finance. Mark answer d: if the case is to be referred to President-Finance. Mark answer e: if the candidate is to be selected.Geeta Kothari was born on 10th September 1980. She has been working in the Finance Department of an organization for the past four years after completing her MBA with Finance specialisation. She has secured 50 percent marks in the selection process.
....

MCQ-> Read the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the questionsThere is an essential and irreducible ‘duality’ in the normative conceptualization of an individual person. We can see the person in terms of his or her ‘agency’, recognizing and respecting his or her ability to form goals, commitments, values, etc., and we can also see the person in terms of his or her ‘well-being’. This dichotomy is lost in a model of exclusively self- interested motivation, in which a person’s agency must be entirely geared to his or her own well-being. But once that straitjacket of self-interested motivation is removed, it becomes possible to recognize the indisputable fact that the person’s agency can well be geared to considerations not covered - or at least not fully covered - by his or her own well-being. Agency may be seen as important (not just instrumentally for the pursuit of well-being, but also intrinsically), but that still leaves open the question as to how that agency is to be evaluated and appraised. Even though the use of one’s agency is a matter for oneself to judge, the need for careful assessment of aims, objective, allegiances, etc., and the conception of the good, may be important and exacting. To recognize the distinction between the ‘agency aspect’ and the ‘well-being aspect’ of a person does not require us to take the view that the person’s success as an agent must be independent, or completely separable from, his or her success in terms of well-being. A person may well feel happier and better off as a result of achieving what he or she wanted to achieve - perhaps for his or her family, or community, or class, or party, or some other cause. Also it is quite possible that a person’s well-being will go down as a result of frustration if there is some failure to achieve what he or she wanted to achieve as an agent, even though those achievements are not directly concerned with his or her well-being. There is really no sound basis for demanding that the agency aspect and the well-being aspect of a person should be independent of each other, and it is, I suppose, even possible that every change in one will affect the other as well. However, the point at issue is not the plausibility of their independence, but the sustainability and relevance of the distinction. The fact that two variables may be so related that one cannot change without the other, does not imply that they are the same variable, or that they will have the same values, or that the value of one can be obtained from the other on basis of some simple transformation. The importance of an agency achievement does not rest entirely on the enhancement of well-being that it may indirectly cause. The agency achievement and well-being achievement, both of which have some distinct importance, may be casually linked with each other, but this fact does not compromise the specific importance of either. In so far as utility - based welfare calculations concentrate only on the well- being of the person, ignoring the agency aspect, or actually fails to distinguish between the agency aspect and well-being aspect altogether, something of real importance is lost.According to the ideas in the passage, the following are not true expect:
....

MCQ-> The persistent patterns in the way nations fight reflect their cultural and historical traditions and deeply rooted attitudes that collectively make up their strategic culture. These patterns provide insights that go beyond what can be learnt just by comparing armaments and divisions. In the Vietnam War, the strategic tradition of the United States called for forcing the enemy to fight a massed battle in an open area, where superior American weapons would prevail. The United States was trying to re-fight World War II in the jungles of Southeast Asia, against an enemy with no intention of doing so. Some British military historians describe the Asian way of war as one of indirect attacks, avoiding frontal attacks meant to overpower an opponent. This traces back to Asian history and geography: the great distances and harsh terrain have often made it difficult to execute the sort of open-field clashes allowed by the flat terrain and relatively compact size of Europe. A very different strategic tradition arose in Asia. The bow and arrow were metaphors for an Eastern way of war. By its nature, the arrow is an indirect weapon. Fired from a distance of hundreds of yards, it does not necessitate immediate physical contact with the enemy. Thus, it can be fired from hidden positions. When fired from behind a ridge, the barrage seems to come out of nowhere, taking the enemy by surprise. The tradition of this kind of fighting is captured in the classical strategic writings of the East. The 2,000 years' worth of Chinese writings on war constitutes the most subtle writings on the subject in any language. Not until Clausewitz, did the West produce a strategic theorist to match the sophistication of Sun-tzu, whose Art of War was written 2,300 years earlier. In Sun-tzu and other Chinese writings, the highest achievement of arms is to defeat an adversary without fighting. He wrote: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Actual combat is just one among many means towards the goal of subduing an adversary. War contains too many surprises to be a first resort. It can lead to ruinous losses, as has been seen time and again. It can have the unwanted effect of inspiring heroic efforts in an enemy, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and as the Japanese found out after Pearl Harbor. Aware of the uncertainties of a military campaign, Sun-tzu advocated war only after the most thorough preparations. Even then it should be quick and clean. Ideally, the army is just an instrument to deal the final blow to an enemy already weakened by isolation, poor morale, and disunity. Ever since Sun-tzu, the Chinese have been seen as masters of subtlety who take measured actions to manipulate an adversary without his knowledge. The dividing line between war and peace can be obscure. Low-level violence often is the backdrop to a larger strategic campaign. The unwitting victim, focused on the day-to-day events, never realizes what's happening to him until it's too late. History holds many examples. The Viet Cong lured French and U.S. infantry deep into the jungle, weakening their morale over several years. The mobile army of the United States was designed to fight on the plains of Europe, where it could quickly move unhindered from one spot to the next. The jungle did more than make quick movement impossible; broken down into smaller units and scattered in isolated bases, US forces were deprived of the feeling of support and protection that ordinarily comes from being part of a big army. The isolation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was not just a logistical detail, something that could be overcome by, for instance, bringing in reinforcements by helicopter. In a big army reinforcements are readily available. It was Napoleon who realized the extraordinary effects on morale that come from being part of a larger formation. Just the knowledge of it lowers the soldier's fear and increases his aggressiveness. In the jungle and on isolated bases, this feeling was removed. The thick vegetation slowed down the reinforcements and made it difficult to find stranded units. Soldiers felt they were on their own. More important, by altering the way the war was fought, the Viet Cong stripped the United States of its belief in the inevitability of victory, as it had done to the French before them. Morale was high when these armies first went to Vietnam. Only after many years of debilitating and demoralizing fighting did Hanoi launch its decisive attacks, at Dienbienphu in 1954 and against Saigon in 1975. It should be recalled that in the final push to victory the North Vietnamese abandoned their jungle guerrilla tactics completely, committing their entire army of twenty divisions to pushing the South Vietnamese into collapse. This final battle, with the enemy's army all in one place, was the one that the United States had desperately wanted to fight in 1965. When it did come out into the open in 1975, Washington had already withdrawn its forces and there was no possibility of re-intervention. The Japanese early in World War II used a modern form of the indirect attack, one that relied on stealth and surprise for its effect. At Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia, stealth and surprise were attained by sailing under radio silence so that the navy's movements could not be tracked. Moving troops aboard ships into Southeast Asia made it appear that the Japanese army was also "invisible." Attacks against Hawaii and Singapore seemed, to the American and British defenders, to come from nowhere. In Indonesia and the Philippines the Japanese attack was even faster than the German blitz against France in the West. The greatest military surprises in American history have all been in Asia. Surely there is something going on here beyond the purely technical difficulties of detecting enemy movements. Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam all came out of a tradition of surprise and stealth. U.S. technical intelligence – the location of enemy units and their movements was greatly improved after each surprise, but with no noticeable improvement in the American ability to foresee or prepare what would happen next. There is a cultural divide here, not just a technical one. Even when it was possible to track an army with intelligence satellites, as when Iraq invaded Kuwait or when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, surprise was achieved. The United States was stunned by Iraq's attack on Kuwait even though it had satellite pictures of Iraqi troops massing at the border. The exception that proves the point that cultural differences obscure the West's understanding of Asian behavior was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. This was fully anticipated and understood in advance. There was no surprise because the United States understood Moscow's worldview and thinking. It could anticipate Soviet action almost as well as the Soviets themselves, because the Soviet Union was really a Western country. The difference between the Eastern and the Western way of war is striking. The West's great strategic writer, Clausewitz, linked war to politics, as did Sun-tzu. Both were opponents of militarism, of turning war over to the generals. But there all similarity ends. Clausewitz wrote that the way to achieve a larger political purpose is through destruction of the enemy's army. After observing Napoleon conquer Europe by smashing enemy armies to bits, Clausewitz made his famous remark in On War (1932) that combat is the continuation of politics by violent means. Morale and unity are important, but they should be harnessed for the ultimate battle. If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all. In this view, war proceeds along a fixed course and occupies a finite extent of time, like a play in three acts with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The end, the final scene, decides the issue for good. When things don't work out quite this way, the Western military mind feels tremendous frustration. Sun-tzu's great disciples, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, are respected in Asia for their clever use of indirection and deception to achieve an advantage over stronger adversaries. But in the West their approach is seen as underhanded and devious. To the American strategic mind, the Viet Cong guerrilla did not fight fairly. He should have come out into the open and fought like a man, instead of hiding in the jungle and sneaking around like a cat in the night. According to the author, the main reason for the U.S. losing the Vietnam war was
....