Statistical matters are typed by using ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Statistical matters are typed by using

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MCQ->Statistical matters are typed by using....

MCQ-> In the following passage, some of the words have been left out. Read the passage carefully and select the correct answer for the given blank out of the four alternatives.But representatives have cynically chosen to look the other ________(1)_________ when matters of justice are involved. They seem to have only a will to power; to be part of a new __________(2)_________ elite. ________(3)_________ they forget that the history of struggle is the future of struggle. Maoism is one extreme _________(4)___________ struggle _________(5)__________ corrupt appropriative and greedy elites; there are others.look the other ________(6)_________ when matters of justice are involved.look the other_________ when matters of justice are involved. ....

MCQ-> Analyse the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the questions that follow: Advances in economic theory in the 1970s and 1980s illuminated the limits of markets; they showed that unfettered markets do not lead to economic efficiency whenever information is imperfect or markets are missing (for instance, good insurance markets to cover the key risks confronting individuals). And information is always imperfect and markets are always incomplete. Nor do markets, by themselves, necessarily lead to economic efficiency when the task of a country is to absorb new technology, to close the “knowledge gap”: a central feature of development. Today, most academic economists agree that markets, by themselves, do not lead to efficiency; the question is whether government can improve matters. While it is difficult for economics to perform experiments to test their theories, as a chemist or a physicist might, the world provides a vast array of natural experiments as dozens of countries try different strategies. Unfortunately, because each country differs in its history and circumstances and in the myriad of details in the policies – and details do matter – it is often difficult to get a clear interpretation. What is clear, however, is that there have been marked differences in performance, that the most successful countries have been those in Asia, and that in most of the Asian countries, government played a very active role. As we look more carefully at the effects of particular policies, these conclusions are reinforced: there is a remarkable congruence between what economic theory says government should do and what the East Asian governments actually did. By the same token, the economic theories based on imperfect information and incomplete risk markets that predicted that the free flow of short-term capital – a key feature of market fundamentalist policies – would produce not growth but instability have also been borne out.“… whether government can improve matters”. Here ‘matters’ indicates
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MCQ-> Analyze the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the questions that follow. The assumption of rationality puts an economist in a position to “explain” some features of market behavior, such as the dispersion of prices of psychophysically identical goods such as beer according to the amount spent on advertising them (no doubt, the fact that most beer is bought by individuals rather than as raw material by firms, which could be expected to be more rational than individuals, is part of the explanation.) Clearly something is wrong somewhere with the usual model of a competitive market with perfect information, for the virtually content less advertising cannot be considered as increasing the utility of beer in an obvious way. But if one can keep the assumption of rational actors, one need not get into the intellectual swamp of sentiment nor of preferences that depend on price. If one agrees, for example, that consumers use advertising as an index of the effort a producer will put into protecting its reputation and so as a predictor of quality control efforts, one can combine it with the standard mechanism and derive testable consequences from it. But why, logically speaking, does it not matter that any of us, with a few years’ training, could disprove the assumptions? It is for the same reason that the statistical mechanics of gases is not undermined when Rutherford teaches a lot of only moderately bright physicists to use X-ray diffraction to disprove the assumption that molecules are little hard elastic balls. The point is, departures that Rutherford teaches us to find from the mechanism built into statistical mechanics are small and hardly ever systematic at level of gases. Ignorance and error about the quality of beer is also, unlikely to be systematic at the level of the consumers’ beer market, though it would become systematic if buyers imposed quality control procedures on sellers in contracts of sale (as corporations very often do in their contracts with suppliers). So when we find beers that advertising can make the ignorance and error systematic at the level of markets, just as lasers with wavelengths resonant with the internal structures and sizes of molecules can make molecular motions in gases systematic. The interesting one is that virtually content-less advertising is nevertheless information to a rational actor.Which of the following statements would be the closest to the arguments in the passage?
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MCQ-> People are continually enticed by such "hot" performance, even if it lasts for brief periods. Because of this susceptibility, brokers or analysts who have had one or two stocks move up sharply, or technicians who call one turn correctly, are believed to have established a credible record and can readily find market followings. Likewise, an advisory service that is right for a brief time can beat its drums loudly. Elaine Garzarelli gained near immortality when she purportedly "called" the 1987 crash. Although, as the market strategist for Shearson Lehman, her forecast was never published in a research report, nor indeed communicated to its clients, she still received widespread recognition and publicity for this call, which was made in a short TV interview on CNBC. Still, her remark on CNBC that the Dow could drop sharply from its then 5300 level rocked an already nervous market on July 23, 1996. What had been a 40-point gain for the Dow turned into a 40-point loss, a good deal of which was attributed to her comments.The truth is, market-letter writers have been wrong in their judgments far more often than they would like to remember. However, advisors understand that the public considers short-term results meaningful when they are, more often than not, simply chance. Those in the public eye usually gain large numbers of new subscribers for being right by random luck. Which brings us to another important probability error that falls under the broad rubric of representativeness. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman call this one the "law of small numbers.". The statistically valid "law of large numbers" states that large samples will usually be highly representative of the population from which they are drawn; for example, public opinion polls are fairly accurate because they draw on large and representative groups. The smaller the sample used, however (or the shorter the record), the more likely the findings are chance rather than meaningful. Yet the Tversky and Kahneman study showed that typical psychological or educational experimenters gamble their research theories on samples so small that the results have a very high probability of being chance. This is the same as gambling on the single good call of an advisor. The psychologists and educators are far too confident in the significance of results based on a few observations or a short period of time, even though they are trained in statistical techniques and are aware of the dangers.Note how readily people over generalize the meaning of a small number of supporting facts. Limited statistical evidence seems to satisfy our intuition no matter how inadequate the depiction of reality. Sometimes the evidence we accept runs to the absurd. A good example of the major overemphasis on small numbers is the almost blind faith investors place in governmental economic releases on employment, industrial production, the consumer price index, the money supply, the leading economic indicators, etc. These statistics frequently trigger major stock- and bond-market reactions, particularly if the news is bad. Flash statistics, more times than not, are near worthless. Initial economic and Fed figures are revised significantly for weeks or months after their release, as new and "better" information flows in. Thus, an increase in the money supply can turn into a decrease, or a large drop in the leading indicators can change to a moderate increase. These revisions occur with such regularity you would think that investors, particularly pros, would treat them with the skepticism they deserve. Alas, the real world refuses to follow the textbooks. Experience notwithstanding, investors treat as gospel all authoritative-sounding releases that they think pinpoint the development of important trends. An example of how instant news threw investors into a tailspin occurred in July of 1996. Preliminary statistics indicated the economy was beginning to gain steam. The flash figures showed that GDP (gross domestic product) would rise at a 3% rate in the next several quarters, a rate higher than expected. Many people, convinced by these statistics that rising interest rates were imminent, bailed out of the stock market that month. To the end of that year, the GDP growth figures had been revised down significantly (unofficially, a minimum of a dozen times, and officially at least twice). The market rocketed ahead to new highs to August l997, but a lot of investors had retreated to the sidelines on the preliminary bad news. The advice of a world champion chess player when asked how to avoid making a bad move. His answer: "Sit on your hands”. But professional investors don't sit on their hands; they dance on tiptoe, ready to flit after the least particle of information as if it were a strongly documented trend. The law of small numbers, in such cases, results in decisions sometimes bordering on the inane. Tversky and Kahneman‘s findings, which have been repeatedly confirmed, are particularly important to our understanding of some stock market errors and lead to another rule that investors should follow.Which statement does not reflect the true essence of the passage? I. Tversky and Kahneman understood that small representative groups bias the research theories to generalize results that can be categorized as meaningful result and people simplify the real impact of passable portray of reality by small number of supporting facts. II. Governmental economic releases on macroeconomic indicators fetch blind faith from investors who appropriately discount these announcements which are ideally reflected in the stock and bond market prices. III. Investors take into consideration myopic gain and make it meaningful investment choice and fail to see it as a chance of occurrence. IV. lrrational overreaction to key regulators expressions is same as intuitive statistician stumbling disastrously when unable to sustain spectacular performance.....