The European country which first started trade with India was? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. The European country which first started trade with India was?

Answer: Portugal

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MCQ-> DIRECTIONS for questions 24 to 50: Each of the five passages given below is followed by questions. For each question, choose the best answer.The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created in the early 1990s as a component of the Uruguay Round negotiation. However, it could have been negotiated as part of the Tokyo Round of the 1970s, since that negotiation was an attempt at a 'constitutional reform' of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Or it could have been put off to the future, as the US government wanted. What factors led to the creation of the WTO in the early 1990s?One factor was the pattern of multilateral bargaining that developed late in the Uruguay Round. Like all complex international agreements, the WTO was a product of a series of trade-offs between principal actors and groups. For the United States, which did not want a new Organisation, the dispute settlement part of the WTO package achieved its longstanding goal of a more effective and more legal dispute settlement system. For the Europeans, who by the 1990s had come to view GATT dispute settlement less in political terms and more as a regime of legal obligations, the WTO package was acceptable as a means to discipline the resort to unilateral measures by the United States. Countries like Canada and other middle and smaller trading partners were attracted by the expansion of a rules-based system and by the symbolic value of a trade Organisation, both of which inherently support the weak against the strong. The developing countries were attracted due to the provisions banning unilateral measures. Finally, and perhaps most important, many countries at the Uruguay Round came to put a higher priority on the export gains than on the import losses that the negotiation would produce, and they came to associate the WTO and a rules-based system with those gains. This reasoning - replicated in many countries - was contained in U.S. Ambassador Kantor's defence of the WTO, and it amounted to a recognition that international trade and its benefits cannot be enjoyed unless trading nations accept the discipline of a negotiated rules-based environment.A second factor in the creation of the WTO was pressure from lawyers and the legal process. The dispute settlement system of the WTO was seen as a victory of legalists over pragmatists but the matter went deeper than that. The GATT, and the WTO, are contract organisations based on rules, and it is inevitable that an Organisation created to further rules will in turn be influenced by the legal process. Robert Hudec has written of the 'momentum of legal development', but what is this precisely? Legal development can be defined as promotion of the technical legal values of consistency, clarity (or, certainty) and effectiveness; these are values that those responsible for administering any legal system will seek to maximise. As it played out in the WTO, consistency meant integrating under one roof the whole lot of separate agreements signed under GATT auspices; clarity meant removing ambiguities about the powers of contracting parties to make certain decisions or to undertake waivers; and effectiveness meant eliminating exceptions arising out of grandfather-rights and resolving defects in dispute settlement procedures and institutional provisions. Concern for these values is inherent in any rules-based system of co-operation, since without these values rules would be meaningless in the first place. Rules, therefore, create their own incentive for fulfilment.The momentum of legal development has occurred in other institutions besides the GATT, most notably in the European Union (EU). Over the past two decades the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently rendered decisions that have expanded incrementally the EU's internal market, in which the doctrine of 'mutual recognition' handed down in the case Cassis de Dijon in 1979 was a key turning point. The Court is now widely recognised as a major player in European integration, even though arguably such a strong role was not originally envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, which initiated the current European Union. One means the Court used to expand integration was the 'teleological method of interpretation', whereby the actions of member states were evaluated against 'the accomplishment of the most elementary community goals set forth in the Preamble to the [Rome] treaty'. The teleological method represents an effort to keep current policies consistent with stated goals, and it is analogous to the effort in GATT to keep contracting party trade practices consistent with stated rules. In both cases legal concerns and procedures are an independent force for further cooperation.In large part the WTO was an exercise in consolidation. In the context of a trade negotiation that created a near- revolutionary expansion of international trade rules, the formation of the WTO was a deeply conservative act needed to ensure that the benefits of the new rules would not be lost. The WTO was all about institutional structure and dispute settlement: these are the concerns of conservatives and not revolutionaries, which is why lawyers and legalists took the lead on these issues. The WTO codified the GATT institutional practice that had developed by custom over three decades, and it incorporated a new dispute settlement system that was necessary to keep both old and new rules from becoming a sham. Both the international structure and the dispute settlement system were necessary to preserve and enhance the integrity of the multilateral trade regime that had been built incrementally from the 1940s to the 1990s.What could be the closest reason why the WTO was not formed in the 1970s?
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MCQ-> Read the following passage and answer the given questions. After the Second World War, the leaders of the Western world tried to build institutions to prevent the conflicts of the preceding decades from recurring. They wanted to foster both prosperity and interdependence, to 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible'. Their work bore fruit. Expanded global trade has raised incomes around the world. While globalisation is sometimes portrayed as a corporate plot against the workers; that was not how it was seen before 1914. British trade unions were in favour of free trade, which kept down food prices for their members and also opened up markets for the factories in which they worked. Yet, as the Brexit vote demonstrates globalisation now seems to be receding. Most economists have been blindsided by the backslash. Free trade can be a hard sell politically. The political economy of trade is treacherous. Its benefits, though substantial, are dilute, but its costs are often concentrated. This gives those affected a strong incentive to push for protectionism. Globalisation itself thus seems to create forces that erode political support for integration. Deeper economic integration required harmonisation of laws and regulations across countries. Differences in rules on employment contracts or product safety requirements, for instance, act as barriers to trade. Trade agreements like the TransPacific Partnership focus more on "nontariff barriers" than they do on tariff reduction. The net impact of this is likely to be that some individuals, consumers and businesses are not likely to be as benefitted as others and given rise to discontent. Thus the consequences of such trade agreements often run counter to popular preferences. Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner, has warned that companies influence over trade rules harms workers and erodes support for trade liberalisation. Clumsy government efforts to compensate workers hurt by globalisation contributed to the global financial crisis, by facilitating excessive household borrowing, among other things. Researchers have also documented how the cost of America's growing trade with China has fallen disproportionately on certain American cities. Such costs perpetuate a cycle of globalisation. Periods of global integration and technological progress generate rising inequality, which inevitably triggers two countervailing forces, one beneficial and one harmful. On the one hand, governments tend to respond to rising inequality by increasing redistribution and investing in education, on the other, inequality leads to political upheaval and war. The first great era of globalisation, which ended in 1914, gave way to a long period of declining inequality, in which harmful forces played a bigger rise than beneficial ones. History might repeat itself, he warns. Such warnings do not amount to arguments against globalisation. As many economists are quick to note, the benefits of openness are massive. It is increasingly clear, however, that supporters of economic integration underestimated the risks both that big slices of society would feel left behind and that nationalism would continue to provide an alluring alternative. Either error alone might have undercut support for globalisation and the relative peace and prosperity it has brought in combination, they threaten to reverse it.What can be concluded from the example of Britain cited in the passage ?
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MCQ-> Read the following passage and answer the given questions.Politics is local but most problems are international. That is the fundamental problem for national governments caught between the twin forces of globalisation and voters' anger. Tfie European refugee crisis, for example, seems to cry out for a continentwide solution. But the tide of migrants has been vast and national governments have been tempted to put up barriers first, and answer questions later. The latest example saw Sweden introduce checks on those travelling from Denmark, leading the turn country, in turn, to impose temporary controls on its southern border with Germany. Antiimmigration parties have been gaining in the polls, with the exception of the German Chancellor; mainstream politicians want to head off the challenge. In a way, this looks like the same mismatch that has plagued the euro a single currency without a unitary fiscal and political authority. Many economists have advocated much greater integration of the euro zone in the wake of the bloc's crisis. The European banking system. would be stronger if there was a comprehensive depositinsurance scheme, the economy would be more balanced if there were fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries. But such plans are unpopular with voters in rich countries (who perceive them as handouts) Fand in poor countries (who worry about the implied loss of local control that reforms would require). All that the European Union's (EU) leaders have managed so far is to cobble together solutions (such as the Greek bailouts) at the last minute. Gone is the pledge of unity of the G20's summit in London in 2009, when leaders agreed on a coordinated stimulus in response to the financial crisis. Central banks are now heading in different directions, the Federal Reserve has just tightened monetary policy while the European Central Bank and the. Bank of Japan are committed to easing. Trade creates tighter links between countries, but global trade growth has been sluggish in recent years. The OECD thinks that trade grew by only 2% in volume in 2015. No longer is trade rising faster than Global GDP, as it was before the crisis. International agreements require compromise, which leaves politicians vulnerable to criticism from inflexiblecomponents. Voters are already dissatisfied with their lot after years of sluggish gains (or declines) in living standards. When populist politicians suggest that voters' woes are all the fault of foreigners, they find a ready audience. Furthermore, economic woes can lead to much more aggressive foreign policy. In the developed world, demographic constraints ( a static or shrinking workforce) may limit the scope for the kind of rapid growth needed to reduce the debt burden and make voters happier. Boosting that sluggish growth rate through domestic reforms (breaking up producer cartels, making labour markets more flexible) is very hard because such reforms arouse strong opposition from those affected. The danger is that a vicious cycle sets in. Global problems are not tackled because governments fail to cooperate, voters get angrier and push their leaders into more nationalistic positions and conflict which poses a threat to all.What can be concluded from the example of the Greek bailout cited in the passage?
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MCQ-> Before the internet, one of the most rapid changes to the global economy and trade was wrought by something so blatantly useful that it is hard to imagine a struggle to get it adopted: the shipping container. In the early 1960s, before the standard container became ubiquitous, freight costs were I0 per cent of the value of US imports, about the same barrier to trade as the average official government import tariff. Yet in a journey that went halfway round the world, half of those costs could be incurred in two ten-mile movements through the ports at either end. The predominant ‘break-bulk’ method, where each shipment was individually split up into loads that could be handled by a team of dockers, was vastly complex and labour-intensive. Ships could take weeks or months to load, as a huge variety of cargoes of different weights, shapes and sizes had to be stacked together by hand. Indeed, one of the most unreliable aspects of such a labour-intensive process was the labour. Ports, like mines, were frequently seething pits of industrial unrest. Irregular work on one side combined with what was often a tight-knit, well - organized labour community on the other.In 1956, loading break-bulk cargo cost $5.83 per ton. The entrepreneurial genius who saw the possibilities for standardized container shipping, Malcolm McLean, floated his first containerized ship in that year and claimed to be able to shift cargo for 15.8 cents a ton. Boxes of the same size that could be loaded by crane and neatly stacked were much faster to load. Moreover, carrying cargo in a standard container would allow it to be shifted between truck, train and ship without having to be repacked each time.But between McLean’s container and the standardization of the global market were an array of formidable obstacles. They began at home in the US with the official Interstate Commerce Commission, which could prevent price competition by setting rates for freight haulage by route and commodity, and the powerful International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) labour union. More broadly, the biggest hurdle was achieving what economists call ‘network effects’: the benefit of a standard technology rises exponentially as more people use it. To dominate world trade, containers had to be easily interchangeable between different shipping lines, ports, trucks and railcars. And to maximize efficiency, they all needed to be the same size. The adoption of a network technology often involves overcoming the resistance of those who are heavily invested in the old system. And while the efficiency gains are clear to see, there are very obvious losers as well as winners. For containerization, perhaps the most spectacular example was the demise of New York City as a port.In the early I950s, New York handled a third of US seaborne trade in manufactured goods. But it was woefully inefficient, even with existing break-bulk technology: 283 piers, 98 of which were able to handle ocean-going ships, jutted out into the river from Brooklyn and Manhattan. Trucks bound‘ for the docks had to fiive through the crowded, narrow streets of Manhattan, wait for an hour or two before even entering a pier, and then undergo a laborious two-stage process in which the goods foot were fithr unloaded into a transit shed and then loaded onto a ship. ‘Public loader’ work gangs held exclusive rights to load and unload on a particular pier, a power in effect granted by the ILA, which enforced its monopoly with sabotage and violence against than competitors. The ILA fought ferociously against containerization, correctly foreseeing that it would destroy their privileged position as bandits controlling the mountain pass. On this occasion, bypassing them simply involved going across the river. A container port was built in New Jersey, where a 1500-foot wharf allowed ships to dock parallel to shore and containers to be lified on and off by crane. Between 1963 - 4 and 1975 - 6, the number of days worked by longshoremen in Manhattan went from 1.4 million to 127,041.Containers rapidly captured the transatlantic market, and then the growing trade with Asia. The effect of containerization is hard to see immediately in freight rates, since the oil price hikes of the 1970s kept them high, but the speed with which shippers adopted; containerization made it clear it brought big benefits of efficiency and cost. The extraordinary growth of the Asian tiger economies of Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong, which based their development strategy on exports, was greatly helped by the container trade that quickly built up between the US and east Asia. Ocean-borne exports from South Korea were 2.9 million tons in 1969 and 6 million in 1973, and its exports to the US tripled.But the new technology did not get adopted all on its own. It needed a couple of pushes from government - both, as it happens, largely to do with the military. As far as the ships were concerned, the same link between the merchant and military navy that had inspired the Navigation Acts in seventeenth-century England endured into twentieth-century America. The government's first helping hand was to give a spur to the system by adopting it to transport military cargo. The US armed forces, seeing the efficiency of the system, started contracting McLean’s company Pan-Atlantic, later renamed Sea-land, to carry equipment to the quarter of a million American soldiers stationed in Western Europe. One of the few benefits of America's misadventure in Vietnam was a rapid expansion of containerization. Because war involves massive movements of men and material, it is often armies that pioneer new techniques in supply chains.The government’s other role was in banging heads together sufficiently to get all companies to accept the same size container. Standard sizes were essential to deliver the economies of scale that came from interchangeability - which, as far as the military was concerned, was vital if the ships had to be commandeered in case war broke out. This was a significant problem to overcome, not least because all the companies that had started using the container had settled on different sizes. Pan- Atlantic used 35- foot containers, because that was the maximum size allowed on the highways in its home base in New Jersey. Another of the big shipping companies, Matson Navigation, used a 24-foot container since its biggest trade was in canned pineapple from Hawaii, and a container bigger than that would have been too heavy for a crane to lift. Grace Line, which largely traded with Latin America, used a foot container that was easier to truck around winding mountain roads.Establishing a US standard and then getting it adopted internationally took more than a decade. Indeed, not only did the US Maritime Administration have to mediate in these rivalries but also to fight its own turf battles with the American Standards Association, an agency set up by the private sector. The matter was settled by using the power of federal money: the Federal Maritime Board (FMB), which handed out to public subsidies for shipbuilding, decreed that only the 8 x 8-foot containers in the lengths of l0, 20, 30 or 40 feet would be eligible for handouts.Identify the correct statement:
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