UnionGovernment approved the cancellation of Gitanjali Gems’ special economic zone(SEZ) project in which state? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. UnionGovernment approved the cancellation of Gitanjali Gems’ special economic zone(SEZ) project in which state?

Answer: Maharashtra

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MCQ-> Read the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the questionsThe idea of demarcating certain areas within the country as special economic zones to promote investment and growth is not new. A large country unable to provide the kind of facilities and environment that can attract foreign investment throughout the country often finds it feasible and attractive to carve up some of its areas where such facilities can be provided. The laws and procedures for setting up new industries are waived to make the area business-friendly with developed infrastructure and a one-window interaction with government. In addition, huge tax benefits are promised to lure investors. China’s experience shows that if chalked out and implemented with care such a policy can accelerate the flow of capital and technology from abroad and thereby speed up growth. However, SEZs may not be the best option in all situations to clear the bottlenecks in growth. India’s experience with export processing zones (EPZs) bears this out. They have failed in India for the simple reason that the factors that made the SEZs successful in China have been absent here. In India, as in China, EPZs were thought of as a way of providing an escape route from the stranglehold of control that prevailed over the Indian economy. But even while promising to ease the rigours of controls, Indian policy-makers could not give up their penchant for micromanaging from the centre and undoing the promised relaxations with all kinds of qualifications and “guidelines”. Over last two decades India has evolved into a market economy and much of governmental control has disappeared, but the flow of foreign direct investment has not reached anywhere near the levels of China. Besides, infrastructure building has fallen far short of what is required. Even after three years of the enactment of the Electricity Act (2003), private investment in electricity generation is still a trickle with the states refusing to give up the monopoly of their electricity boards in the matter of purchase of the power generated. While swearing by growth, governments at both the centre and the states cite the fiscal responsibility laws to plead their helplessness in making the required investments to improve infrastructure. Given the situation, the SEZs have apparently been thought of as a simple way out. In its enthusiasm for SEZs the commerce ministry forgot two critical lessons of the Chinese experience, viz., that an SEZ must be of an adequate size to provide opportunities for reaping the benefits of large-scale operations and their number should be few. Every industry or economic activity worth its name is now seeking SEZ status. Proposals are now being floated to invite foreign educational institutions to come to India with promises of SEZ treatment! The finance ministry apprehends a loss of nearly 1,75,000 crore in direct taxes, customs duties and excise duties over the next five years.The objective of the author in writing the above passage seems to be to
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MCQ-> Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words/phrases have been printed in bold tohelp you locate them while answering some of the questions. During the last few years, a lot of hype has been heaped on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). With their large populations and rapid growth, these countries, so the argument goes, will soon become some of the largest economies in the world and, in the case of China, the largest of all by as early as 2020. But the BRICS, as well as many other emerging-market economieshave recently experienced a sharp economic slowdown. So, is the honeymoon over? Brazil’s GDP grew by only 1% last year, and may not grow by more than 2% this year, with its potential growth barely above 3%. Russia’s economy may grow by barely 2% this year, with potential growth also at around 3%, despite oil prices being around $100 a barrel. 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Second, the idea that emerging-market economies could fully decouple from economic weakness in advanced economies was farfetched : recession in the eurozone, near-recession in the United Kingdom and Japan in 2011-2012, and slow economic growth in the United States were always likely to affect emerging market performance negatively – via trade, financial links, and investor confidence. For example, the ongoing euro zone downturn has hurt Turkey and emergingmarket economies in Central and Eastern Europe, owing to trade links. Third, most BRICS and a few other emerging markets have moved toward a variant of state capitalism. This implies a slowdown in reforms that increase the private sector’s productivity and economic share, together with a greater economic role for state-owned enterprises (and for state-owned banks in the allocation of credit and savings), as well as resource nationalism, trade protectionism, import substitution industrialization policies, and imposition of capital controls. This approach may have worked at earlier stages of development and when the global financial crisis caused private spending to fall; but it is now distorting economic activity and depressing potential growth. Indeed, China’s slowdown reflects an economic model that is, as former Premier Wen Jiabao put it, “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable,” and that now is adversely affecting growth in emerging Asia and in commodity-exporting emerging markets from Asia to Latin America and Africa. The risk that China will experience a hard landing in the next two years may further hurt many emerging economies. Fourth, the commodity super-cycle that helped Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and many other commodity-exporting emerging markets may be over. Indeed, a boom would be difficult to sustain, given China’s slowdown, higher investment in energysaving technologies, less emphasis on capital-and resource-oriented growth models around the world, and the delayed increase in supply that high prices induced. The fifth, and most recent, factor is the US Federal Reserve’s signals that it might end its policy of quantitative easing earlier than expected, and its hints of an even tual exit from zero interest rates. both of which have caused turbulence in emerging economies’ financial markets. Even before the Fed’s signals, emergingmarket equities and commodities had underperformed this year, owing to China’s slowdown. Since then, emerging-market currencies and fixed-income securities (government and corporate bonds) have taken a hit. The era of cheap or zerointerest money that led to a wall of liquidity chasing high yields and assets equities, bonds, currencies, and commodities – in emerging markets is drawing to a close. Finally, while many emerging-market economies tend to run current-account surpluses, a growing number of them – including Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and India – are running deficits. And these deficits are now being financed in riskier ways: more debt than equity; more short-term debt than longterm debt; more foreign-currency debt than local-currency debt; and more financing from fickle cross-border interbank flows. These countries share other weaknesses as well: excessive fiscal deficits, abovetarget inflation, and stability risk (reflected not only in the recent political turmoil in Brazil and Turkey, but also in South Africa’s labour strife and India’s political and electoral uncertainties). The need to finance the external deficit and to avoid excessive depreciation (and even higher inflation) calls for raising policy rates or keeping them on hold at high levels. But monetary tightening would weaken already-slow growth. Thus, emerging economies with large twin deficits and other macroeconomic fragilities may experience further downward pressure on their financial markets and growth rates. These factors explain why growth in most BRICS and many other emerging markets has slowed sharply. Some factors are cyclical, but others – state capitalism, the risk of a hard landing in China, the end of the commodity supercycle -are more structural. Thus, many emerging markets’ growth rates in the next decade may be lower than in the last – as may the outsize returns that investors realised from these economies’ financial assets (currencies, equities. bonds, and commodities). 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