Idiom of To blow one's own trumpet ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Idiom of To blow one's own trumpet

Answer: To speak proudly of oneself

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MCQ-> Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it. Certain words have been printed in ‘’bold’’ to help you locate them while answering some of the questions.The evolution of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) trend has been as profound as it has been rapid. It represents the more visible sign that the boundaries between personal life and work life are blurring. The 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. model of working solely from office has become archaic and increasingly people are working extended hours from a range of locations. At the very heart of this evolution is the ability to access enterprise networks from anywhere and anytime. The concept of cloud computing serves effectively to extend the office out of office. The much heralded benefit of BYOD is greater productivity. However, recent research has suggested that this is the greatest myth of BYOD and the reality is that BYOD in practise poses new challenges that may outweigh the benefits. A worldwide commissioned by Fortinet choose to look at attitudes towards BYOD and security from the user’s point of view instead of the IT managers. Specifically the survey was conducted in 15 territories on a group of graduate employees in their early twenties because they represent the first generation to enter the workplace with an expectation of own device use. Moreover, they also represent tomorrow’s influences and decision markers. The survey findings reveals that for financial organizations, the decision to embrace BYOB is extremely dangerous. Larger organizations will have mature IT strategies and policies in place. But what about smaller financial business? They might not have such well developed strategies to protect confidential data. Crucially, within younger employee groups, 55% of the people share an expectation that they should be allowed to use their own devices in the workplace or for work purposes. With this expectation comes the very real risk that employees may consider contravening company policy banning the use of own devices. The threats posed by this level of subversion cannot be overstated. The survey casts doubt on the idea of BYOD leading to greater productivity by revealing the real reason people want to use their own devices. Only 26% of people in this age group cite efficiency as the reason they want to use their own devices, while 63% admit that the main reason is so they have access to their favourite applications. But with personal applications so close to hand, the risks to the business must surely include distraction and time wasting. To support this assumption 46% of people polled acknowledged time wasting as the greatest threat to the organization, while 42% citing greater exposure to theft or loss of confidential data. Clearly, from a user perspective there is great deal of contradiction surroundings BYOB and there exists an undercurrent of selfishness where users expect to use their own devices, but mostly for personal interest. They recognize the risks to the organization but are adamant that those risks are worth talking.According to the passage, for which of the following reasons did Fortinet conduct the survey on a group of graduate employees in their early twenties?A: As this group represents the future decision makers B: As this group represents the first generation who entered the workforce with a better understanding of sophisticated gadgets C: As this group represents the first generation to enter the workplace expecting that they can use their own devices for work purpose...

MCQ-> Read the passage and answer the questions that follow: Passage I There arc two main kinds of development agency: the one which trace to introduce specific changes and is mainly interested in material development: and the other which is primarily interested in people. On the whole the first wants to "get things done"; the other to develop the people's own abilities for leadership, wise judgement and co-oprative action. For agencies of the second kind, the material result is less important than the way it is achieved. Agencies and workers, who themselves decide the specific form development should take, assume, of course, that they know better than the people what the people need. Most social development workers and technical officers have worked on this assumption in the past, and although they were often right they were not always right, for they sometimes made the mistake of assuming that what was good within their own culture was certain to be good in other cultures too. Missionaries, for instance, insisted on their converts wearing clothes because they were used to them themselves, and they established schools with syllabuses that suited the missionaries' own countries, rather than the countries where the schools were built. Agencies and their workers tend to be more careful nowadays, but experts and specialists trained in Western ways still often make mistakes in cultures other than their own. Agencies everywhere are now realizing that they are risking failure if they assume that their own ideas are right in environments and cultures other than their own. The East African Groundnut Scheme failed because it did not take the local conditions of soil and climate sufficiently into account. The West African Anchau Rural Development Scheme illustrates, less spectacularly, the result of failing to consider the human factor when working in a different culture. This Scheme was started in 1937 to eradicate sleeping sickness from a part of the Zaria province of the Northern Region of Nigeria. The people in charge made a detailed survey of the area, made detailed studies of the farming conditions in sample hamlets and made a careful census of the people. Indeed, they scientifically examined in minute detail every aspect of the situation that seemed to them important. But it failed because people were thought of as being there "to be done good to" in the mass, but they were not envisaged as persons, each with one's own small world of hopes and fears, who might in some way be consulted.In the passage "development agency" refers to...

MCQ-> The persistent patterns in the way nations fight reflect their cultural and historical traditions and deeply rooted attitudes that collectively make up their strategic culture. These patterns provide insights that go beyond what can be learnt just by comparing armaments and divisions. In the Vietnam War, the strategic tradition of the United States called for forcing the enemy to fight a massed battle in an open area, where superior American weapons would prevail. The United States was trying to re-fight World War II in the jungles of Southeast Asia, against an enemy with no intention of doing so. Some British military historians describe the Asian way of war as one of indirect attacks, avoiding frontal attacks meant to overpower an opponent. This traces back to Asian history and geography: the great distances and harsh terrain have often made it difficult to execute the sort of open-field clashes allowed by the flat terrain and relatively compact size of Europe. A very different strategic tradition arose in Asia. The bow and arrow were metaphors for an Eastern way of war. By its nature, the arrow is an indirect weapon. Fired from a distance of hundreds of yards, it does not necessitate immediate physical contact with the enemy. Thus, it can be fired from hidden positions. When fired from behind a ridge, the barrage seems to come out of nowhere, taking the enemy by surprise. The tradition of this kind of fighting is captured in the classical strategic writings of the East. The 2,000 years' worth of Chinese writings on war constitutes the most subtle writings on the subject in any language. Not until Clausewitz, did the West produce a strategic theorist to match the sophistication of Sun-tzu, whose Art of War was written 2,300 years earlier. In Sun-tzu and other Chinese writings, the highest achievement of arms is to defeat an adversary without fighting. He wrote: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Actual combat is just one among many means towards the goal of subduing an adversary. War contains too many surprises to be a first resort. It can lead to ruinous losses, as has been seen time and again. It can have the unwanted effect of inspiring heroic efforts in an enemy, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and as the Japanese found out after Pearl Harbor. Aware of the uncertainties of a military campaign, Sun-tzu advocated war only after the most thorough preparations. Even then it should be quick and clean. Ideally, the army is just an instrument to deal the final blow to an enemy already weakened by isolation, poor morale, and disunity. Ever since Sun-tzu, the Chinese have been seen as masters of subtlety who take measured actions to manipulate an adversary without his knowledge. The dividing line between war and peace can be obscure. Low-level violence often is the backdrop to a larger strategic campaign. The unwitting victim, focused on the day-to-day events, never realizes what's happening to him until it's too late. History holds many examples. The Viet Cong lured French and U.S. infantry deep into the jungle, weakening their morale over several years. The mobile army of the United States was designed to fight on the plains of Europe, where it could quickly move unhindered from one spot to the next. The jungle did more than make quick movement impossible; broken down into smaller units and scattered in isolated bases, US forces were deprived of the feeling of support and protection that ordinarily comes from being part of a big army. The isolation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was not just a logistical detail, something that could be overcome by, for instance, bringing in reinforcements by helicopter. In a big army reinforcements are readily available. It was Napoleon who realized the extraordinary effects on morale that come from being part of a larger formation. Just the knowledge of it lowers the soldier's fear and increases his aggressiveness. In the jungle and on isolated bases, this feeling was removed. The thick vegetation slowed down the reinforcements and made it difficult to find stranded units. Soldiers felt they were on their own. More important, by altering the way the war was fought, the Viet Cong stripped the United States of its belief in the inevitability of victory, as it had done to the French before them. Morale was high when these armies first went to Vietnam. Only after many years of debilitating and demoralizing fighting did Hanoi launch its decisive attacks, at Dienbienphu in 1954 and against Saigon in 1975. It should be recalled that in the final push to victory the North Vietnamese abandoned their jungle guerrilla tactics completely, committing their entire army of twenty divisions to pushing the South Vietnamese into collapse. This final battle, with the enemy's army all in one place, was the one that the United States had desperately wanted to fight in 1965. When it did come out into the open in 1975, Washington had already withdrawn its forces and there was no possibility of re-intervention. The Japanese early in World War II used a modern form of the indirect attack, one that relied on stealth and surprise for its effect. At Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia, stealth and surprise were attained by sailing under radio silence so that the navy's movements could not be tracked. Moving troops aboard ships into Southeast Asia made it appear that the Japanese army was also "invisible." Attacks against Hawaii and Singapore seemed, to the American and British defenders, to come from nowhere. In Indonesia and the Philippines the Japanese attack was even faster than the German blitz against France in the West. The greatest military surprises in American history have all been in Asia. Surely there is something going on here beyond the purely technical difficulties of detecting enemy movements. Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam all came out of a tradition of surprise and stealth. U.S. technical intelligence – the location of enemy units and their movements was greatly improved after each surprise, but with no noticeable improvement in the American ability to foresee or prepare what would happen next. There is a cultural divide here, not just a technical one. Even when it was possible to track an army with intelligence satellites, as when Iraq invaded Kuwait or when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, surprise was achieved. The United States was stunned by Iraq's attack on Kuwait even though it had satellite pictures of Iraqi troops massing at the border. The exception that proves the point that cultural differences obscure the West's understanding of Asian behavior was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. This was fully anticipated and understood in advance. There was no surprise because the United States understood Moscow's worldview and thinking. It could anticipate Soviet action almost as well as the Soviets themselves, because the Soviet Union was really a Western country. The difference between the Eastern and the Western way of war is striking. The West's great strategic writer, Clausewitz, linked war to politics, as did Sun-tzu. Both were opponents of militarism, of turning war over to the generals. But there all similarity ends. Clausewitz wrote that the way to achieve a larger political purpose is through destruction of the enemy's army. After observing Napoleon conquer Europe by smashing enemy armies to bits, Clausewitz made his famous remark in On War (1932) that combat is the continuation of politics by violent means. Morale and unity are important, but they should be harnessed for the ultimate battle. If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all. In this view, war proceeds along a fixed course and occupies a finite extent of time, like a play in three acts with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The end, the final scene, decides the issue for good. When things don't work out quite this way, the Western military mind feels tremendous frustration. Sun-tzu's great disciples, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, are respected in Asia for their clever use of indirection and deception to achieve an advantage over stronger adversaries. But in the West their approach is seen as underhanded and devious. To the American strategic mind, the Viet Cong guerrilla did not fight fairly. He should have come out into the open and fought like a man, instead of hiding in the jungle and sneaking around like a cat in the night. According to the author, the main reason for the U.S. losing the Vietnam war was
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MCQ->In each of the questions, four alternatives are given for the Idiom/Phrase. Choose the alternative which best expresses the meaning of the Idiom/Phrase and click the button corresponding to it.Blow one's trumpet...

MCQ-> In the following questions, four alternatives are given for the Idiom/Phrase printed in bold in the sentence, Choose the alternative which best expresses the meaning of the Idiom/Phrase.He is known for blowing his own trumpet.
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