WHAT IS MANUFACTURED USING BESSEMER PROCESS ?->(Show Answer!)

1. WHAT IS MANUFACTURED USING BESSEMER PROCESS

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MCQ-> Read the following passages carefully and answer the questions given at the end of each passage.PASSAGE 1In a study of 150 emerging nations looking back fifty years, it was found that the single most powerful driver of economic booms was sustained growth in exports especially of manufactured products. Exporting simple manufactured goods not only increases income and consumption at home, it generates foreign revenues that allow the country to import the machinery and materials needed to improve its factories without running up huge foreign bills and debts. In short, in the case of manufacturing, one good investment leads to another. Once an economy starts down the manufacturing path, its momentum can carry it in the right direction for some time. When the ratio of investment to GDP surpasses 30 percent, it tends to stick at the level for almost nine years (on an average). The reason being that many of these nations seemed to show a strong leadership commitment to investment, particularly to investment in manufacturing. Today various international authorities have estimated that the emerging world need many trillions of dollars in investment on these kinds of transport and communication networks. The modern outlier is India where investment as a share of the economy exceeded 30 percent of GDP over the course of the 2000s, but little of that money went into factories. Indian manufacturing had been stagnant for decades at around 15 percent of GDP. The stagnation stems from the failures of the state to build functioning ports and power plants and to create an environment in which the rules governing labour, land and capital are designed and enforced in a way that encourages entrepreneurs to invest, particularly in factories. India has disappointed on both counts creating labour friendly rules and workable land acquisition norms. Between 1989 and 2010 India generated about ten million new jobs in manufacturing, but nearly all those jobs were created in enterprises that are small and informal and thus better suited to dodge India’s bureaucracy and its extremely restrictive rules regarding firing workers It is commonly said in India that the labour laws are so onerous that it is practically impossible to comply with even half of them without violating the other half.Informal shops, many of them one man operations, now account for 39 percent of India’s manufacturing workforce, up from 19 percent in 1989 and they are simply too small to compete in global markets. Harvard economist Dani Rodrik calls manufacturing the “automatic escalator” of development, because once a country finds a niche in global manufacturing, productivity often seems to start rising automatically. During its boom years India was growing in large part on the strength of investment in technology service industries, not manufacturing. This was put forward as a development strategy. Instead of growing richer by exporting even more advanced manufactured products, India could grow rich by exporting the services demanded in this new information age. These arguments began to gain traction early in the 2010s.In new research on the “service escalators”, a 2014 working paper from the World Bank made the case that the old growth escalator in manufacturing was already giving way to a new one in service industries. The report argued that while manufacturing is in retreat as a share of the global economy and is producing fewer jobs, services are still growing, contributing more to growth in output and jobs for nations rich and poor. However, one basic problem with the idea of service escalator is that in the emerging world most of the new service jobs are still in very traditional ventures. A decade on, India’s tech sector is still providing relatively simple IT services mainly in the same back office operations it started with and the number of new jobs it is creating is relatively small. In India, only about two million people work in IT services, or less than 1 percent of the workforce. So far the rise of these service industries has not been big enough to drive the mass modernisation of rural farm economies. People can move quickly from working in the fields to working on an assembly line, because both rely for the most part on manual labour. The leap from the farm to the modern service sector is much tougher since those jobs often require advanced skills. Workers who have moved into IT service jobs have generally come from a pool of relatively better educated members of the urban middle class, who speak English and have atleast some facility with computers. Finding jobs for the underemployed middle class is important but there are limits to how deeply it can transform the economy, because it is a relatively small part of the population. For now, the rule is still factories first, not service first.According to the information in the above passage, manufacturing in India has been stagnant because there is
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MCQ-> Before the internet, one of the most rapid changes to the global economy and trade was wrought by something so blatantly useful that it is hard to imagine a struggle to get it adopted: the shipping container. In the early 1960s, before the standard container became ubiquitous, freight costs were I0 per cent of the value of US imports, about the same barrier to trade as the average official government import tariff. Yet in a journey that went halfway round the world, half of those costs could be incurred in two ten-mile movements through the ports at either end. The predominant ‘break-bulk’ method, where each shipment was individually split up into loads that could be handled by a team of dockers, was vastly complex and labour-intensive. Ships could take weeks or months to load, as a huge variety of cargoes of different weights, shapes and sizes had to be stacked together by hand. Indeed, one of the most unreliable aspects of such a labour-intensive process was the labour. Ports, like mines, were frequently seething pits of industrial unrest. Irregular work on one side combined with what was often a tight-knit, well - organized labour community on the other.In 1956, loading break-bulk cargo cost $5.83 per ton. The entrepreneurial genius who saw the possibilities for standardized container shipping, Malcolm McLean, floated his first containerized ship in that year and claimed to be able to shift cargo for 15.8 cents a ton. Boxes of the same size that could be loaded by crane and neatly stacked were much faster to load. Moreover, carrying cargo in a standard container would allow it to be shifted between truck, train and ship without having to be repacked each time.But between McLean’s container and the standardization of the global market were an array of formidable obstacles. They began at home in the US with the official Interstate Commerce Commission, which could prevent price competition by setting rates for freight haulage by route and commodity, and the powerful International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) labour union. More broadly, the biggest hurdle was achieving what economists call ‘network effects’: the benefit of a standard technology rises exponentially as more people use it. To dominate world trade, containers had to be easily interchangeable between different shipping lines, ports, trucks and railcars. And to maximize efficiency, they all needed to be the same size. The adoption of a network technology often involves overcoming the resistance of those who are heavily invested in the old system. And while the efficiency gains are clear to see, there are very obvious losers as well as winners. For containerization, perhaps the most spectacular example was the demise of New York City as a port.In the early I950s, New York handled a third of US seaborne trade in manufactured goods. But it was woefully inefficient, even with existing break-bulk technology: 283 piers, 98 of which were able to handle ocean-going ships, jutted out into the river from Brooklyn and Manhattan. Trucks bound‘ for the docks had to fiive through the crowded, narrow streets of Manhattan, wait for an hour or two before even entering a pier, and then undergo a laborious two-stage process in which the goods foot were fithr unloaded into a transit shed and then loaded onto a ship. ‘Public loader’ work gangs held exclusive rights to load and unload on a particular pier, a power in effect granted by the ILA, which enforced its monopoly with sabotage and violence against than competitors. The ILA fought ferociously against containerization, correctly foreseeing that it would destroy their privileged position as bandits controlling the mountain pass. On this occasion, bypassing them simply involved going across the river. A container port was built in New Jersey, where a 1500-foot wharf allowed ships to dock parallel to shore and containers to be lified on and off by crane. Between 1963 - 4 and 1975 - 6, the number of days worked by longshoremen in Manhattan went from 1.4 million to 127,041.Containers rapidly captured the transatlantic market, and then the growing trade with Asia. The effect of containerization is hard to see immediately in freight rates, since the oil price hikes of the 1970s kept them high, but the speed with which shippers adopted; containerization made it clear it brought big benefits of efficiency and cost. The extraordinary growth of the Asian tiger economies of Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong, which based their development strategy on exports, was greatly helped by the container trade that quickly built up between the US and east Asia. Ocean-borne exports from South Korea were 2.9 million tons in 1969 and 6 million in 1973, and its exports to the US tripled.But the new technology did not get adopted all on its own. It needed a couple of pushes from government - both, as it happens, largely to do with the military. As far as the ships were concerned, the same link between the merchant and military navy that had inspired the Navigation Acts in seventeenth-century England endured into twentieth-century America. The government's first helping hand was to give a spur to the system by adopting it to transport military cargo. The US armed forces, seeing the efficiency of the system, started contracting McLean’s company Pan-Atlantic, later renamed Sea-land, to carry equipment to the quarter of a million American soldiers stationed in Western Europe. One of the few benefits of America's misadventure in Vietnam was a rapid expansion of containerization. Because war involves massive movements of men and material, it is often armies that pioneer new techniques in supply chains.The government’s other role was in banging heads together sufficiently to get all companies to accept the same size container. Standard sizes were essential to deliver the economies of scale that came from interchangeability - which, as far as the military was concerned, was vital if the ships had to be commandeered in case war broke out. This was a significant problem to overcome, not least because all the companies that had started using the container had settled on different sizes. Pan- Atlantic used 35- foot containers, because that was the maximum size allowed on the highways in its home base in New Jersey. Another of the big shipping companies, Matson Navigation, used a 24-foot container since its biggest trade was in canned pineapple from Hawaii, and a container bigger than that would have been too heavy for a crane to lift. Grace Line, which largely traded with Latin America, used a foot container that was easier to truck around winding mountain roads.Establishing a US standard and then getting it adopted internationally took more than a decade. Indeed, not only did the US Maritime Administration have to mediate in these rivalries but also to fight its own turf battles with the American Standards Association, an agency set up by the private sector. The matter was settled by using the power of federal money: the Federal Maritime Board (FMB), which handed out to public subsidies for shipbuilding, decreed that only the 8 x 8-foot containers in the lengths of l0, 20, 30 or 40 feet would be eligible for handouts.Identify the correct statement:
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