Which one of the following will completely divide $$5^{71} + 5^{72} + 5^{73}$$ ? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Which one of the following will completely divide $$5^{71} + 5^{72} + 5^{73}$$ ?

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By: anil on 05 May 2019 01.41 am

Expression : $$5^{71} + 5^{72} + 5^{73}$$ = $$5^{71} (1 + 5 + 5^2) = 5^{71} imes 31$$ = $$5^{70} imes 155$$ Clearly, above expression is easily divisible by 155. => Ans - (C)

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