A square footing 2.5 m x 2.5 m is built in a homogeneous bed of sand of unit weight 20 kN/m3 and having an angle of shearing resistance of 36°. The depth of the base of the footing is 1.5 m below the ground surface. Calculate the safe load that can ?->(Show Answer!)

1. A square footing 2.5 m x 2.5 m is built in a homogeneous bed of sand of unit weight 20 kN/m3 and having an angle of shearing resistance of 36°. The depth of the base of the footing is 1.5 m below the ground surface. Calculate the safe load that can be carried by a footing with a factor of safety 3 against complete shear failure?Bearing capacity factors Nc =G5.4, Nq =49.4 and Nr =54.0

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MCQ->A square footing 2.5 m x 2.5 m is built in a homogeneous bed of sand of unit weight 20 kN/m3 and having an angle of shearing resistance of 36°. The depth of the base of the footing is 1.5 m below the ground surface. Calculate the safe load that can be carried by a footing with a factor of safety 3 against complete shear failure?Bearing capacity factors Nc =G5.4, Nq =49.4 and Nr =54.0....

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