Which of the following weapons of war are conspicuous by their absence in the archaeological finds of the Indus Valley Civilisation? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Which of the following weapons of war are conspicuous by their absence in the archaeological finds of the Indus Valley Civilisation?

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MCQ-> The persistent patterns in the way nations fight reflect their cultural and historical traditions and deeply rooted attitudes that collectively make up their strategic culture. These patterns provide insights that go beyond what can be learnt just by comparing armaments and divisions. In the Vietnam War, the strategic tradition of the United States called for forcing the enemy to fight a massed battle in an open area, where superior American weapons would prevail. The United States was trying to re-fight World War II in the jungles of Southeast Asia, against an enemy with no intention of doing so. Some British military historians describe the Asian way of war as one of indirect attacks, avoiding frontal attacks meant to overpower an opponent. This traces back to Asian history and geography: the great distances and harsh terrain have often made it difficult to execute the sort of open-field clashes allowed by the flat terrain and relatively compact size of Europe. A very different strategic tradition arose in Asia. The bow and arrow were metaphors for an Eastern way of war. By its nature, the arrow is an indirect weapon. Fired from a distance of hundreds of yards, it does not necessitate immediate physical contact with the enemy. Thus, it can be fired from hidden positions. When fired from behind a ridge, the barrage seems to come out of nowhere, taking the enemy by surprise. The tradition of this kind of fighting is captured in the classical strategic writings of the East. The 2,000 years' worth of Chinese writings on war constitutes the most subtle writings on the subject in any language. Not until Clausewitz, did the West produce a strategic theorist to match the sophistication of Sun-tzu, whose Art of War was written 2,300 years earlier. In Sun-tzu and other Chinese writings, the highest achievement of arms is to defeat an adversary without fighting. He wrote: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Actual combat is just one among many means towards the goal of subduing an adversary. War contains too many surprises to be a first resort. It can lead to ruinous losses, as has been seen time and again. It can have the unwanted effect of inspiring heroic efforts in an enemy, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and as the Japanese found out after Pearl Harbor. Aware of the uncertainties of a military campaign, Sun-tzu advocated war only after the most thorough preparations. Even then it should be quick and clean. Ideally, the army is just an instrument to deal the final blow to an enemy already weakened by isolation, poor morale, and disunity. Ever since Sun-tzu, the Chinese have been seen as masters of subtlety who take measured actions to manipulate an adversary without his knowledge. The dividing line between war and peace can be obscure. Low-level violence often is the backdrop to a larger strategic campaign. The unwitting victim, focused on the day-to-day events, never realizes what's happening to him until it's too late. History holds many examples. The Viet Cong lured French and U.S. infantry deep into the jungle, weakening their morale over several years. The mobile army of the United States was designed to fight on the plains of Europe, where it could quickly move unhindered from one spot to the next. The jungle did more than make quick movement impossible; broken down into smaller units and scattered in isolated bases, US forces were deprived of the feeling of support and protection that ordinarily comes from being part of a big army. The isolation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was not just a logistical detail, something that could be overcome by, for instance, bringing in reinforcements by helicopter. In a big army reinforcements are readily available. It was Napoleon who realized the extraordinary effects on morale that come from being part of a larger formation. Just the knowledge of it lowers the soldier's fear and increases his aggressiveness. In the jungle and on isolated bases, this feeling was removed. The thick vegetation slowed down the reinforcements and made it difficult to find stranded units. Soldiers felt they were on their own. More important, by altering the way the war was fought, the Viet Cong stripped the United States of its belief in the inevitability of victory, as it had done to the French before them. Morale was high when these armies first went to Vietnam. Only after many years of debilitating and demoralizing fighting did Hanoi launch its decisive attacks, at Dienbienphu in 1954 and against Saigon in 1975. It should be recalled that in the final push to victory the North Vietnamese abandoned their jungle guerrilla tactics completely, committing their entire army of twenty divisions to pushing the South Vietnamese into collapse. This final battle, with the enemy's army all in one place, was the one that the United States had desperately wanted to fight in 1965. When it did come out into the open in 1975, Washington had already withdrawn its forces and there was no possibility of re-intervention. The Japanese early in World War II used a modern form of the indirect attack, one that relied on stealth and surprise for its effect. At Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia, stealth and surprise were attained by sailing under radio silence so that the navy's movements could not be tracked. Moving troops aboard ships into Southeast Asia made it appear that the Japanese army was also "invisible." Attacks against Hawaii and Singapore seemed, to the American and British defenders, to come from nowhere. In Indonesia and the Philippines the Japanese attack was even faster than the German blitz against France in the West. The greatest military surprises in American history have all been in Asia. Surely there is something going on here beyond the purely technical difficulties of detecting enemy movements. Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam all came out of a tradition of surprise and stealth. U.S. technical intelligence – the location of enemy units and their movements was greatly improved after each surprise, but with no noticeable improvement in the American ability to foresee or prepare what would happen next. There is a cultural divide here, not just a technical one. Even when it was possible to track an army with intelligence satellites, as when Iraq invaded Kuwait or when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, surprise was achieved. The United States was stunned by Iraq's attack on Kuwait even though it had satellite pictures of Iraqi troops massing at the border. The exception that proves the point that cultural differences obscure the West's understanding of Asian behavior was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. This was fully anticipated and understood in advance. There was no surprise because the United States understood Moscow's worldview and thinking. It could anticipate Soviet action almost as well as the Soviets themselves, because the Soviet Union was really a Western country. The difference between the Eastern and the Western way of war is striking. The West's great strategic writer, Clausewitz, linked war to politics, as did Sun-tzu. Both were opponents of militarism, of turning war over to the generals. But there all similarity ends. Clausewitz wrote that the way to achieve a larger political purpose is through destruction of the enemy's army. After observing Napoleon conquer Europe by smashing enemy armies to bits, Clausewitz made his famous remark in On War (1932) that combat is the continuation of politics by violent means. Morale and unity are important, but they should be harnessed for the ultimate battle. If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all. In this view, war proceeds along a fixed course and occupies a finite extent of time, like a play in three acts with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The end, the final scene, decides the issue for good. When things don't work out quite this way, the Western military mind feels tremendous frustration. Sun-tzu's great disciples, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, are respected in Asia for their clever use of indirection and deception to achieve an advantage over stronger adversaries. But in the West their approach is seen as underhanded and devious. To the American strategic mind, the Viet Cong guerrilla did not fight fairly. He should have come out into the open and fought like a man, instead of hiding in the jungle and sneaking around like a cat in the night. According to the author, the main reason for the U.S. losing the Vietnam war was
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MCQ->Which of the following weapons of war are conspicuous by their absence in the archaeological finds of the Indus Valley Civilisation?....

MCQ->The richest Biodiversity in India is found in Copyright www.examrace.comThe richest Biodiversity in India is found in Silent Valley Valley of Kashmir Valley of flowers Damodar Valley Read more at: http://www.examrace.com/SPSC/Chhattisgarh-PSC/CGPSC-Exam-Papers/CGPSC-General-Studies-2011-Solved-Paper-Part-3.htmlCopyright www.examrace.com Copyright www.examrace.comThe richest Biodiversity in India is found in Silent Valley Valley of Kashmir Valley of flowers Damodar Valley Read more at: http://www.examrace.com/SPSC/Chhattisgarh-PSC/CGPSC-Exam-Papers/CGPSC-General-Studies-2011-Solved-Paper-Part-3.htmlCopyright www.examrace.com Copyright www.examrace.comThe richest Biodiversity in India is found in Silent Valley Valley of Kashmir Valley of flowers Damodar Valley Read more at: http://www.examrace.com/SPSC/Chhattisgarh-PSC/CGPSC-Exam-Papers/CGPSC-General-Studies-2011-Solved-Paper-Part-3.htmlCopyright www.examrace.com....

MCQ-> Thought the Cold War has ended selective tactics are still continuing for ensuring the military and economic dominance of developed countries Various types of technology denial regimes are still being enforced which are now being mainly targeted against developing countries like India Today we in India encounter twin problems On one side there is a large scale strengthening of our neighbours through supply of arms and clandestine support to their nuclear and missile programmes and on the other side all efforts are being made to weaken our indigenous technology growth through control regimes and dumping of low-tech system accompanied with high commercial pitch in critical areas Growth of indigenous technology and self-reliance are the only answer to the problem Thus in the environment around India the number of missiles and nuclear powers are continuously increasing and destructive weapons continue to pile up around us in spite of arms reduction treaties To understand the implications of various types of warfare that may affect us we need to take a quick look at the evolution of war weaponry and the types of warfare I am highlighting this point for the reason that in less than a century we could see change in the nature of warfare and its effects of society In early years of human history it was mostly direct human warfare During the twentieth century up to about 1990 the warfare was weapon driven The weapons used were guns tanks aircraft ships submarines and the nuclear weapons deployed on land/sea/air and also reconnaissance spacecraft. Proliferation of conventional nuclear and biological weapons was at a peak owing to the competition between the superpowers The next phase in a new form has just started from 1990 onwards The world has graduated into economic warfare.The means used is control of market forces through high technology.The participating nations apart from the USA, are Japan the UK France Germany certain South East Asian countries and a few others The driving force is the generation of wealth with certain types of economic doctrine The urgent issue we need to address collectively as a nation is how do we handle the tactics of economic and military dominance in this new form coming from the backdoor ? Today technology is the main driver of economic development at the national level Therefore we have to develop indigenous technologies to enhance our competitive edge and to generate national wealth in all segments of economy Therefore the need of the hour is arm India with technology.Why do certain countries use selective tactics against developing countries ?
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MCQ-> A passage is given with 5 questions following it. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer to each question out of the four alternatives and click the button corresponding to it. Worry is a very common thing. Even children worry as much as grown up people. In his childhood, the writer used to fear that his parents would die suddenly at night. His fear and anxiety was just imaginary. When he was on the war front in Mesopotamia, the writer came to a certain conclusion on worrying. He was a subaltern officer. It was not his duty to plan future actions of war. He was there only to carry out what the superiors would decide. So it was useless to worry. When he took that stand he slept soundly without worry. Here, the writer had some real reason to worry. But he could get rid of it when he found it was useless to worry. He followed the same principle when he was a prisoner of war and he was in Asiatic Turkey. There, too, he banished his worries because nothing of his future depended on himself. The future of the prisoners of war would depend on the various governments. Thus he was able to live there without much worry though he was a prisoner. But his deliberate suppression of worry during the war and as a prisoner did not wholly eradicate his worries. The fear had gone to his subconscious mind and remained there buried. After the war the writer was at home. But whenever a member of his family was absent he feared all sorts of mishap happening to him or her. Moreover, he had a recurring nightmare that he had become a prisoner of war and the war was not going to end. The worries without any real cause here were the manifestations of the fears that he had banished deliberately earlier.Why was the writer able to live in jail without much worry?
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