Scientific Name of Hawthorn, Paul"s Scarlet ? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. Scientific Name of Hawthorn, Paul"s Scarlet ?

Answer: Crataegus oxycantha "Paulii"

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MCQ-> Analyse the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the follow. Popper claimed, scientific beliefs are universal in character, and have to be so if they are to serve us in explanation and prediction. For the universality of a scientific belief implies that, no matter how many instances we have found positive, there will always be an indefinite number of unexamined instances which may or may not also be positive. We have no good reason for supposing that any of these unexamined instances will be positive, or will be negative, so we must refrain from drawing any conclusions. On the other hand, a single negative instance is sufficient to prove that the belief is false, for such an instance is logically incompatible with the universal truth of the belief. Provided, therefore, that the instance is accepted as negative we must conclude that the scientific belief is false. In short, we can sometimes deduce that a universal scientific belief is false but we can never induce that a universal scientific belief is true. It is sometimes argued that this 'asymmetry' between verification and falsification is not nearly as pronounced as Popper declared it to be. Thus, there is no inconsistency in holding that a universal scientific belief is false despite any number of positive instances; and there is no inconsistency either in holding that a universal scientific belief is true despite the evidence of a negative instance. For the belief that an instance is negative is itself a scientific belief and may be falsified by experimental evidence which we accept and which is inconsistent with it. When, for example, we draw a right-angled triangle on the surface of a sphere using parts of three great circles for its sides, and discover that for this triangle Pythagoras' Theorem does not hold, we may decide that this apparently negative instance is not really negative because it is not a genuine instance at all. Triangles drawn on the surfaces of spheres are not the sort of triangles which fall within the scope of Pythagoras' Theorem. Falsification, that is to say, is no more capable of yielding conclusive rejections of scientific belief than verification is of yielding conclusive acceptances of scientific beliefs. The asymmetry between falsification and verification, therefore, has less logical significance than Popper supposed. We should, though, resist this reasoning. Falsifications may not be conclusive, for the acceptances on which rejections are based are always provisional acceptances. But, nevertheless, it remains the case that, in falsification, if we accept falsifying claims then, to remain consistent, we must reject falsified claims. On the other hand, although verifications are also not conclusive, our acceptance or rejection of verifying instances has no implications concerning the acceptance or rejection of verified claims. Falsifying claims sometimes give us a good reason for rejecting a scientific belief, namely when the claims are accepted. But verifying claims, even when accepted, give us no good and appropriate reason for accepting any scientific belief, because any such reason would have to be inductive to be appropriate and there are no good inductive reasons.According to Popper, the statement "Scientific beliefs are universal in character" implies that...

MCQ-> Our propensity to look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the psychological phenomenon of dogmatic thinking or, more generally, dogmatic behaviour: we expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even where there are none; events which do not yield to these attempts we are inclined to treat as a kind of `background noise’; and we stick to our expectations even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept defeat. This dogmatism is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by a situation which can only be dealt with by forcing our conjectures upon the world. Moreover, this dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very nearly right.It is clear that this dogmatic attitude; which makes us stick to our first impressions, is indicative of a strong belief; while a critical attitude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and demands tests, is indicative of a weaker belief. Now according to Hume’s theory, and to the popular theory, the strength of a belief should be a product of repetition; thus it should always grow with experience, and always be greater in less primitive persons. But dogmatic thinking, an uncontrolled wish to impose regularities, a manifest pleasure in rites and in repetition as such, is characteristic of primitives and children; and increasing experience and maturity sometimes create an attitude of caution and criticism rather than of dogmatism.My logical criticism of Hume’s psychological theory, and the considerations connected with it, may seem a little removed from the field of the philosophy of science. But the distinction between dogmatic and critical thinking, or the dogmatic and the critical attitude, brings us right back to our central problem. For the dogmatic attitude is clearly related to the tendency to verify our laws and schemata by seeking to apply them and to confirm them, even to the point of neglecting refutations, whereas the critical attitude is one of readiness to change them - to test them; to refute them; to falsify them, if possible. This suggests that we may identify the critical attitude with the scientific attitude, and the dogmatic attitude with the one which we have described as pseudo-scientific. It further suggests that genetically speaking the pseudo-scientific attitude is more primitive than, and prior to, the scientific attitude: that it is a pre-scientific attitude. And this primitivity or priority also has its logical aspect. For the critical attitude is not so much opposed to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it: criticism must be directed against existing and influential beliefs in need of critical revision – in other words, dogmatic beliefs. A critical attitude needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically.Thus, science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality. From the point of view here developed, all laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, or conjectural, or hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer. Before a theory has been refuted we can never know in what way it may have to be modified.In the context of science, according to the passage, the interaction of dogmatic beliefs and critical attitude can be best described as:
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MCQ->Select the set in which the statements are logically related. A. Mathew and Paul are brothers. B. Siblings are known to quarrel often. C. Mathew and Paul don.t quarrel. D. All those who quarrel are siblings. E. Paul and Mathew quarrel often. F. Mathew and Paul cannot be siblings. ...

MCQ-> Mathematicians are assigned a number called Erdos number (named after the famous mathematician, Paul Erdos). Only Paul Erdos himself has an Erdos number of zero. Any mathematician who has written a research paper with Erdos has an Erdos number of 1.For other mathematicians, the calculation of his/her Erdos number is illustrated below:Suppose that a mathematician X has co-authored papers with several other mathematicians. 'From among them, mathematician Y has the smallest Erdos number. Let the Erdos number of Y be y. Then X has an Erdos number of y+1. Hence any mathematician with no co-authorship chain connected to Erdos has an Erdos number of infinity. :In a seven day long mini-conference organized in memory of Paul Erdos, a close group of eight mathematicians, call them A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H, discussed some research problems. At the beginning of the conference, A was the only participant who had an infinite Erdos number. Nobody had an Erdos number less than that of F.On the third day of the conference F co-authored a paper jointly with A and C. This reduced the average Erdos number of the group of eight mathematicians to 3. The Erdos numbers of B, D, E, G and H remained unchanged with the writing of this paper. Further, no other co-authorship among any three members would have reduced the average Erdos number of the group of eight to as low as 3.• At the end of the third day, five members of this group had identical Erdos numbers while the other three had Erdos numbers distinct from each other.• On the fifth day, E co-authored a paper with F which reduced the group's average Erdos number by 0.5. The Erdos numbers of the remaining six were unchanged with the writing of this paper.• No other paper was written during the conference.The person having the largest Erdos number at the end of the conference must have had Erdos number (at that time):
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MCQ-> Study the followin information carefully and answer the questions.Four houses Blue, Green, Red and Yellow are located in a row in the given order. Each of the houses is occupied by a person earning a fixed amount of a salary. The four persons are Paul, Krishna, Laxman, and Som.Read the following instruction carefully: I. Paul lives between Som and Krishna II. Laxman does not stay in Blue house III. The person living in Red house earns more than that of person living in Blue IV. Salary of Som is more than that of Paul but lesser than that of Krishna V. One of the person earns Rs. 80, 000 VI. The person earning Rs. 110,000 is not Laxman VII. The salary difference between Laxman and Son is Rs. 30,000 VIII. The House in which Krishna lives is located between houses with persons earning salaries of Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 50,000 IX. Krishna does not live in Yellow house, and the person living in yellow house is not earning lowest salary among the four persons.Who lives in Red house?
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