By whom was the most accepted theory for ascent of sap was given? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. By whom was the most accepted theory for ascent of sap was given?

Answer: Dixon and Joly

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MCQ->Read the Following statements and answer the question that follows:1. But its most advanced formulation is called superstring theory, which even predicts the precise number of dimensions: ten. 2. However, the theory has already swept across the major physics research laboratories of the world and has irrevocably altered the scientific landscape of modern physics, generating a staggering number of research papers in the scientific literature (over 5,000 by one count). 3. Scientifically, the hyperspace theory goes by the names of Kaluza-Klein theory and supergravity. 4. The usual three dimensions of space (length, width, and breadth) and one of time are now extended by six more spatial dimensions. 5. We caution that the theory of hyperspace has not yet been experimentally confirmed and would, in fact, be exceedingly difficult to prove in the laboratory. Rank the above five statements so as to make it a logical sequence:...

MCQ-> Our propensity to look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the psychological phenomenon of dogmatic thinking or, more generally, dogmatic behaviour: we expect regularities everywhere and attempt to find them even where there are none; events which do not yield to these attempts we are inclined to treat as a kind of `background noise’; and we stick to our expectations even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept defeat. This dogmatism is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by a situation which can only be dealt with by forcing our conjectures upon the world. Moreover, this dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very nearly right.It is clear that this dogmatic attitude; which makes us stick to our first impressions, is indicative of a strong belief; while a critical attitude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and demands tests, is indicative of a weaker belief. Now according to Hume’s theory, and to the popular theory, the strength of a belief should be a product of repetition; thus it should always grow with experience, and always be greater in less primitive persons. But dogmatic thinking, an uncontrolled wish to impose regularities, a manifest pleasure in rites and in repetition as such, is characteristic of primitives and children; and increasing experience and maturity sometimes create an attitude of caution and criticism rather than of dogmatism.My logical criticism of Hume’s psychological theory, and the considerations connected with it, may seem a little removed from the field of the philosophy of science. But the distinction between dogmatic and critical thinking, or the dogmatic and the critical attitude, brings us right back to our central problem. For the dogmatic attitude is clearly related to the tendency to verify our laws and schemata by seeking to apply them and to confirm them, even to the point of neglecting refutations, whereas the critical attitude is one of readiness to change them - to test them; to refute them; to falsify them, if possible. This suggests that we may identify the critical attitude with the scientific attitude, and the dogmatic attitude with the one which we have described as pseudo-scientific. It further suggests that genetically speaking the pseudo-scientific attitude is more primitive than, and prior to, the scientific attitude: that it is a pre-scientific attitude. And this primitivity or priority also has its logical aspect. For the critical attitude is not so much opposed to the dogmatic attitude as super-imposed upon it: criticism must be directed against existing and influential beliefs in need of critical revision – in other words, dogmatic beliefs. A critical attitude needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically.Thus, science must begin with myths, and with the criticism of myths; neither with the collection of observations, nor with the invention of experiments, but with the critical discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and practices. The scientific tradition is distinguished from the pre-scientific tradition in having two layers. Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality. From the point of view here developed, all laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, or conjectural, or hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer. Before a theory has been refuted we can never know in what way it may have to be modified.In the context of science, according to the passage, the interaction of dogmatic beliefs and critical attitude can be best described as:
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MCQ-> The motive force that has carried the psychoanalytic movement to a voluminous wave of popular attention and created for it considerable following those discontent with traditional methods and attitudes, is the frank direction of the psychological instruments of exploration to the insistent and intimate problems of human relations. However false or however true its conclusions, however weak or strong its arguments, however effective or defective or even pernicious its practice, its mission is broadly humanistic. Psychological enlightenment is presented as a program of salvation. By no other appeal could the service of psychology have become so glorified. The therapeutic promise of psychoanalysis came as the most novel, most ambitious, most releasing of the long procession of curative systems that mark the History of mental healing.To the contemporary trends in psychology psychoanalysis actually offered a rebuke, a challenge, a supplement, though it appeared to ignore them. With the practical purpose of applied psychology directed to human efficiency it had no direct relation and thus no quarrel. The solution of behaviorism, likewise bidding for popular approval by reducing adjustment to a program of conditioning, it inevitably found alien and irrelevant, as the behaviorist in reciprocity found psychoanalytic doctrine mystical, fantastic, assumptive, remote. Even to the cognate formulations of mental hygiene, as likewise in its contacts with related fields of psychology, psychoanalysis made no conciliatory advances. Towards psychiatry, its nearest of kin, it took an unfriendly position, quite too plainly implying a disdain for an unprogressive relative.These estrangements affected its relations throughout the domain of mind and its ills; but they came to head in the practice. From the outset in the days of struggle, when it had but a sparse and scattered discipleship, to the present position of prominence, Freudianism went its own way, for the most part neglected by academic psychology. Of dreams, lapses and neuroses, orthodox psychology had little say. The second reason for the impression made by psychoanalysis when once launched against the tide of academic resistance was its recognition of depth psychology, so much closer to human motivation, so much more intimate and direct than the analysis of mental factors. Most persons in trouble would be grateful for relief without critical examination of the theory behind the practice that helped them.Anyone at all acquainted with the ebb and flow of cures . cures that cure cures that fail . need not be told that the scientific basis of the system is often the least important factor. Many of these systems arise empirically within a practice, which by trial, seems to give results. This is not the case in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis belongs to the typical groups of therapies in which practice is entirely a derivative of theory. Here the pertinent psychological principle reads: .Create a belief in the theory, and the fact will create themselves..The distinctive feature of psychoanalysis is that
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MCQ-> Analyse the following passage and provide appropriate answers for the follow. Popper claimed, scientific beliefs are universal in character, and have to be so if they are to serve us in explanation and prediction. For the universality of a scientific belief implies that, no matter how many instances we have found positive, there will always be an indefinite number of unexamined instances which may or may not also be positive. We have no good reason for supposing that any of these unexamined instances will be positive, or will be negative, so we must refrain from drawing any conclusions. On the other hand, a single negative instance is sufficient to prove that the belief is false, for such an instance is logically incompatible with the universal truth of the belief. Provided, therefore, that the instance is accepted as negative we must conclude that the scientific belief is false. In short, we can sometimes deduce that a universal scientific belief is false but we can never induce that a universal scientific belief is true. It is sometimes argued that this 'asymmetry' between verification and falsification is not nearly as pronounced as Popper declared it to be. Thus, there is no inconsistency in holding that a universal scientific belief is false despite any number of positive instances; and there is no inconsistency either in holding that a universal scientific belief is true despite the evidence of a negative instance. For the belief that an instance is negative is itself a scientific belief and may be falsified by experimental evidence which we accept and which is inconsistent with it. When, for example, we draw a right-angled triangle on the surface of a sphere using parts of three great circles for its sides, and discover that for this triangle Pythagoras' Theorem does not hold, we may decide that this apparently negative instance is not really negative because it is not a genuine instance at all. Triangles drawn on the surfaces of spheres are not the sort of triangles which fall within the scope of Pythagoras' Theorem. Falsification, that is to say, is no more capable of yielding conclusive rejections of scientific belief than verification is of yielding conclusive acceptances of scientific beliefs. The asymmetry between falsification and verification, therefore, has less logical significance than Popper supposed. We should, though, resist this reasoning. Falsifications may not be conclusive, for the acceptances on which rejections are based are always provisional acceptances. But, nevertheless, it remains the case that, in falsification, if we accept falsifying claims then, to remain consistent, we must reject falsified claims. On the other hand, although verifications are also not conclusive, our acceptance or rejection of verifying instances has no implications concerning the acceptance or rejection of verified claims. Falsifying claims sometimes give us a good reason for rejecting a scientific belief, namely when the claims are accepted. But verifying claims, even when accepted, give us no good and appropriate reason for accepting any scientific belief, because any such reason would have to be inductive to be appropriate and there are no good inductive reasons.According to Popper, the statement "Scientific beliefs are universal in character" implies that...

MCQ-> In the following passage, there are blanks, each of which has been numbered. These numbers are printed below the passage and against each, five words are suggested. One of which fits the blank appropriately. Find out the appropriate word in each case.The first proposal I submitted for my dissertation at UCLA was to write a theory of personality. My chairman, a kindly man, smiled ….206
….and told me that perhaps this was a bit ambitious for a young graduate student. …..207….I accepted his verdict and changed my topic, but not my desire. It ….208...later, when I had a chance to begin to ….209….a theory in my research on group dynamics for the Navy during the Korean War. As I ….210… the reasons for the persistence of my interest in overarching theory. I had an ...211… memory. When I was around eight years old, I was a ….212…. baseball fan, as was my father. My hero was hou Gehrig. I would approach my father in an attempt to prove him how good Gehrig really was: ‘’He’s terrific!’’ My father’s response caught me off guard: ‘’Yes, but he can’t filed.’’ I wasn’t prepared for that. From then on, my way of ...213… with my father’s responses was to make sure I knew everything about any topic I wanted to talk to him about. Partly as a ….214…. I become a holist. I had to make sure I had ...215… for everything.206
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