The American President John F Kennedy was assassinated in? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. The American President John F Kennedy was assassinated in?

Answer: 1963

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MCQ->After a couple of weeks, Mr. Patel came to know that Dipangshu’s project leader Mr. John, a very competent senior executive, may have wil fully influenced his team members to file a wrong complaint against Dipangshu. Mr. John may have done it because Dipangshu has refused to tow John’s line. Mr. Patel also came to know that Dipangshu was thinking of quitting this job. He felt regretful about his letter to Dipangshu. He wanted to resolve the complicated situation. He was contemplating following five actions in his mind. I. Talk to Mr. John about Dipangshu and convey to him that losing a bright employee would cost the organization dearly. II. Catch up with Mr. John during coffee break and convey that Dipangshu has a very good track record. III. Chat with Dipangshu during coffee break. IV. Catch up with Dipangshu during coffee break and convey that the organization values him. V. Arrange a meeting among Mr. John, Dipangshu and himself to sort out the difference. Which of the following is the best sequence of actions for resolving the problem?...

MCQ->Select the set in which the statements are logically related. A. Mary is John's wife. B. Mary and John danced together. C. Mary wears John's ring. D. Husband and wives danced the last waltz. E. John loves Mary. F. John danced last with Mary. ...

MCQ-> The persistent patterns in the way nations fight reflect their cultural and historical traditions and deeply rooted attitudes that collectively make up their strategic culture. These patterns provide insights that go beyond what can be learnt just by comparing armaments and divisions. In the Vietnam War, the strategic tradition of the United States called for forcing the enemy to fight a massed battle in an open area, where superior American weapons would prevail. The United States was trying to re-fight World War II in the jungles of Southeast Asia, against an enemy with no intention of doing so. Some British military historians describe the Asian way of war as one of indirect attacks, avoiding frontal attacks meant to overpower an opponent. This traces back to Asian history and geography: the great distances and harsh terrain have often made it difficult to execute the sort of open-field clashes allowed by the flat terrain and relatively compact size of Europe. A very different strategic tradition arose in Asia. The bow and arrow were metaphors for an Eastern way of war. By its nature, the arrow is an indirect weapon. Fired from a distance of hundreds of yards, it does not necessitate immediate physical contact with the enemy. Thus, it can be fired from hidden positions. When fired from behind a ridge, the barrage seems to come out of nowhere, taking the enemy by surprise. The tradition of this kind of fighting is captured in the classical strategic writings of the East. The 2,000 years' worth of Chinese writings on war constitutes the most subtle writings on the subject in any language. Not until Clausewitz, did the West produce a strategic theorist to match the sophistication of Sun-tzu, whose Art of War was written 2,300 years earlier. In Sun-tzu and other Chinese writings, the highest achievement of arms is to defeat an adversary without fighting. He wrote: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Actual combat is just one among many means towards the goal of subduing an adversary. War contains too many surprises to be a first resort. It can lead to ruinous losses, as has been seen time and again. It can have the unwanted effect of inspiring heroic efforts in an enemy, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and as the Japanese found out after Pearl Harbor. Aware of the uncertainties of a military campaign, Sun-tzu advocated war only after the most thorough preparations. Even then it should be quick and clean. Ideally, the army is just an instrument to deal the final blow to an enemy already weakened by isolation, poor morale, and disunity. Ever since Sun-tzu, the Chinese have been seen as masters of subtlety who take measured actions to manipulate an adversary without his knowledge. The dividing line between war and peace can be obscure. Low-level violence often is the backdrop to a larger strategic campaign. The unwitting victim, focused on the day-to-day events, never realizes what's happening to him until it's too late. History holds many examples. The Viet Cong lured French and U.S. infantry deep into the jungle, weakening their morale over several years. The mobile army of the United States was designed to fight on the plains of Europe, where it could quickly move unhindered from one spot to the next. The jungle did more than make quick movement impossible; broken down into smaller units and scattered in isolated bases, US forces were deprived of the feeling of support and protection that ordinarily comes from being part of a big army. The isolation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was not just a logistical detail, something that could be overcome by, for instance, bringing in reinforcements by helicopter. In a big army reinforcements are readily available. It was Napoleon who realized the extraordinary effects on morale that come from being part of a larger formation. Just the knowledge of it lowers the soldier's fear and increases his aggressiveness. In the jungle and on isolated bases, this feeling was removed. The thick vegetation slowed down the reinforcements and made it difficult to find stranded units. Soldiers felt they were on their own. More important, by altering the way the war was fought, the Viet Cong stripped the United States of its belief in the inevitability of victory, as it had done to the French before them. Morale was high when these armies first went to Vietnam. Only after many years of debilitating and demoralizing fighting did Hanoi launch its decisive attacks, at Dienbienphu in 1954 and against Saigon in 1975. It should be recalled that in the final push to victory the North Vietnamese abandoned their jungle guerrilla tactics completely, committing their entire army of twenty divisions to pushing the South Vietnamese into collapse. This final battle, with the enemy's army all in one place, was the one that the United States had desperately wanted to fight in 1965. When it did come out into the open in 1975, Washington had already withdrawn its forces and there was no possibility of re-intervention. The Japanese early in World War II used a modern form of the indirect attack, one that relied on stealth and surprise for its effect. At Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia, stealth and surprise were attained by sailing under radio silence so that the navy's movements could not be tracked. Moving troops aboard ships into Southeast Asia made it appear that the Japanese army was also "invisible." Attacks against Hawaii and Singapore seemed, to the American and British defenders, to come from nowhere. In Indonesia and the Philippines the Japanese attack was even faster than the German blitz against France in the West. The greatest military surprises in American history have all been in Asia. Surely there is something going on here beyond the purely technical difficulties of detecting enemy movements. Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam all came out of a tradition of surprise and stealth. U.S. technical intelligence – the location of enemy units and their movements was greatly improved after each surprise, but with no noticeable improvement in the American ability to foresee or prepare what would happen next. There is a cultural divide here, not just a technical one. Even when it was possible to track an army with intelligence satellites, as when Iraq invaded Kuwait or when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, surprise was achieved. The United States was stunned by Iraq's attack on Kuwait even though it had satellite pictures of Iraqi troops massing at the border. The exception that proves the point that cultural differences obscure the West's understanding of Asian behavior was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. This was fully anticipated and understood in advance. There was no surprise because the United States understood Moscow's worldview and thinking. It could anticipate Soviet action almost as well as the Soviets themselves, because the Soviet Union was really a Western country. The difference between the Eastern and the Western way of war is striking. The West's great strategic writer, Clausewitz, linked war to politics, as did Sun-tzu. Both were opponents of militarism, of turning war over to the generals. But there all similarity ends. Clausewitz wrote that the way to achieve a larger political purpose is through destruction of the enemy's army. After observing Napoleon conquer Europe by smashing enemy armies to bits, Clausewitz made his famous remark in On War (1932) that combat is the continuation of politics by violent means. Morale and unity are important, but they should be harnessed for the ultimate battle. If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all. In this view, war proceeds along a fixed course and occupies a finite extent of time, like a play in three acts with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The end, the final scene, decides the issue for good. When things don't work out quite this way, the Western military mind feels tremendous frustration. Sun-tzu's great disciples, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, are respected in Asia for their clever use of indirection and deception to achieve an advantage over stronger adversaries. But in the West their approach is seen as underhanded and devious. To the American strategic mind, the Viet Cong guerrilla did not fight fairly. He should have come out into the open and fought like a man, instead of hiding in the jungle and sneaking around like a cat in the night. According to the author, the main reason for the U.S. losing the Vietnam war was
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MCQ-> Read the following passage to answer the given questions based on it. Some words/ phrases are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of the questions. “We have always known that heedless self interest was bad morals. We now know that it is bad economies,” said American President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937 in the midst of the Great Depression. And the world has learnt that enlightened self-interest is good economics all over again after the Great Recession of 2009. Americans are entering a period of social change as they are recalibrating their sense of what it means to be a citizen, not just through voting or volunteering but also through commerce. There is a new dimension to civic duty that is growing among Americans – the idea that they can serve not only by spending time in communities and classrooms but by spending more responsibly. In short, Americans are beginning to put their money where their ideals are. In a recent poll most said they had consciously supported local or small neighbourhood businesses and 40 percent said that they had purchased a product because they liked the social or political values of the company that produced it. People were alarmed about ‘blood diamonds’ mined in war zones and used to finance conflict in Africa. They were also willing to pay $2000 more for a car that gets 35 miles per gallon than for one that gives less. though the former is more expensive but environment friendly. Of course consumers have done their own doing-well-by doing-good calculation -a more expensive car that gives. better mileage will save them money in the long run and makes them feel good about protecting the environment. Moreover since 1995, the number of socially responsible investment (SRI) mutual funds, which generally avoid buying shares of companies that profit from tobacco, oil or child labour haA grown from 55 to 260. SRI funds now manage approximately 11 percent of all the money invested in the US financial markets -an estimated S 2.7 trillion. This is evidence of a changing mindset in a nation whose most iconic economist Milton Friedman wrote in 1970 that a corporation’s only moral responsibility was to increase shareholder profits.At first the corporate stance was defensive: companies were punished by consumers for unethical behaviour such as discriminatory labour practices. Thu nexus of activist groups. con – sumers and government regulation could not merely tarnish a company but put it out of business. But corporate America quickly discerned that social responsibility attracts investment capital as well as customer loyalty. creating a virtuous circle. Some companies quickly embraced the new ethos that consumers boycotted prod ucts they considered unethical and others purchase products in part because their manufacturers were responsible. With global warming on t he minds oft many consumers lots of companies are racing to ‘outgreen’ each other. The most progressive companies are talking about a triple bottom line-profit, planet and people – that focuses on how to run a business while Irving io improve environmental anti worker conditions. This is a time when the only that has sunk lower than the Arnett can public’s opinion of Congress is its opinion of business, One burning question is how many of these Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are just shrewd marketing to give companies a halo effect? After all only 8 per cent of the large American corporations go through the trouble of verifying their CSR reports. which many consumers don’t bother to read. And while social responsibility is uric way for companies to get back their reputations consumers too need to make ethical choices.Which of the following reparesnts the changc/s that has/ have occurred in the American outlook? (A) The perception that the government needs to invest resources in business rather than in education, (B) Loss of faith in American corporations as they do not dis burse their profits equitably among shareholders. (C) Americans have cut down on their expenditure drastically to invest only in socially ro sponsible mutual funds....