The civilisation of Greek city states is known as? ?->(Show Answer!)

1. The civilisation of Greek city states is known as?

Answer: Classical Civilisation

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MCQ-> Read the passage and answer the questions that follow: Passage II Reverence is a dirty word at the Almeida Theatre in Islington, North London. Rupert Goold, the artistic director, and Robert Icke, his associate, are resolved to take dusty, distant cultural artefacts of drama and shake them hard. so that they will entertain modern audiences, especially those with no previous knowledge of the plays. Mr Icke holds that to save the classics from withering, a director must be willing even to reinterpret the original author's intentions. This summer Messrs Goold and Icke have directed freshly translated versions of the oldest of all "dusty theatrical artefacts": the ancient Greek tragedies of Aeschylus and Euripides. These versions ruthless) rewrite texts and alter plots. In Euripides's "Medea'. the last of the season of three plays which opened on 1st October directed by Mr Goold. Medea murders her two children as revenge on her unfaithful husband. Not at the Almeida: in this version, her sons die—or perhaps do not—by eating sleeping pills. Mr Icke's version of "Oresteia" by Aeschylus is described as "a new adaptation", but classics scholars insist that it is much more than that. The masked male chorus which propels all Greek tragedy, so memorable in Sir Peter Hall's production at the National Theatre in 1981, is jettisoned. Mr Icke's -Oresteie starts with 46 pages of text (out of 113 in all) that are a dramatisation of the long choral ode in Aeschylus's "Agamemnon-. It deals with his decision to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia to ensure his ships a fair wind for Troy. Mr Icke believes that, without this prelude, it is hard to appreciate fully the ensuing, awe-inspiring family tragedy in which his wife Klytemnestra kills Agamemnon to avenge their daughter's death, and then is murdered in turn by their son Orestes. The extra material makes for a long evening, but it speeds by. Only the "Bakkhai". the second of the Almeida's three plays, conforms to the traditional Greek unities of time and place, and as in ancient Greece, has all the speaking roles played by three actors, backed by a chorus (though of Bacchic ladies rather than masked men). The Greek season defines the Almeida's style of work. Mr Goold has unearthed a rich new seam of modem theatre by reviving and generally energising work by authors such as Luigi Pirandello and Bret Easton Ellis. His delightful version of "The Merchant of Venice"- set in Las Vegas, was played largely for laughs, with the verse adapting easily to a singsong southern American accent. Even his failures, such as a "King Lear and Puccini at the English National Opera, had moments that linger in the memory. Actors like working there. Since small theatres like the Almeida cannot pay well, actors choose the work over the money. In this Greek season, the two most memorable performances are by Lia Williams as Klytemnestra and Kate Fleetwood, who is Mr Goold's wife, as Medea. Each exhibits an emotional range that holds the action together. The rage, temper and insult of the dialogue between Medea and her husband Jason, here conducted on their mobile phones, reveal a direct linguistic link from ancient Greece to contemporary soap opera. Whatever quibbles there might be about the editing, cutting and rewriting of the texts, surely the significant question about this ambitious project is whether the audience is gripped by the performances. Enthusiastic word-of-mouth suggests the answer is yes.In this passage, the word "reverence" can be interpreted as...

MCQ-> Study the following information carefully and answer the question given below P, Q, R, S, T, V and W are seven friends.Each of them likes a particular fruit viz. Apple, Banana, Pear, Guava, Orange, Mango and Watermelon and each of them has a favourite city,viz. Mumbai, Pune, Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad and Cochin. The choices of fruit and favourite city of the seven friends are necessarily in the same order. Q likes Mango and his favourite city is Chennai. The one whose favourite city is Pune likes Watermelon.T’s favourite city is Kolkata. R likes Guava and his favourite city is not Mumbai W’s favourite city is Cochin and he does not like either Banana or Pear. The favourite city of the one who likes Orange is Hyderbad T does not like Pear. P’s favourite city is neither Pune nor Hyderabad S does not like Watermelon.Who likes Apple?
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MCQ-> The persistent patterns in the way nations fight reflect their cultural and historical traditions and deeply rooted attitudes that collectively make up their strategic culture. These patterns provide insights that go beyond what can be learnt just by comparing armaments and divisions. In the Vietnam War, the strategic tradition of the United States called for forcing the enemy to fight a massed battle in an open area, where superior American weapons would prevail. The United States was trying to re-fight World War II in the jungles of Southeast Asia, against an enemy with no intention of doing so. Some British military historians describe the Asian way of war as one of indirect attacks, avoiding frontal attacks meant to overpower an opponent. This traces back to Asian history and geography: the great distances and harsh terrain have often made it difficult to execute the sort of open-field clashes allowed by the flat terrain and relatively compact size of Europe. A very different strategic tradition arose in Asia. The bow and arrow were metaphors for an Eastern way of war. By its nature, the arrow is an indirect weapon. Fired from a distance of hundreds of yards, it does not necessitate immediate physical contact with the enemy. Thus, it can be fired from hidden positions. When fired from behind a ridge, the barrage seems to come out of nowhere, taking the enemy by surprise. The tradition of this kind of fighting is captured in the classical strategic writings of the East. The 2,000 years' worth of Chinese writings on war constitutes the most subtle writings on the subject in any language. Not until Clausewitz, did the West produce a strategic theorist to match the sophistication of Sun-tzu, whose Art of War was written 2,300 years earlier. In Sun-tzu and other Chinese writings, the highest achievement of arms is to defeat an adversary without fighting. He wrote: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Actual combat is just one among many means towards the goal of subduing an adversary. War contains too many surprises to be a first resort. It can lead to ruinous losses, as has been seen time and again. It can have the unwanted effect of inspiring heroic efforts in an enemy, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and as the Japanese found out after Pearl Harbor. Aware of the uncertainties of a military campaign, Sun-tzu advocated war only after the most thorough preparations. Even then it should be quick and clean. Ideally, the army is just an instrument to deal the final blow to an enemy already weakened by isolation, poor morale, and disunity. Ever since Sun-tzu, the Chinese have been seen as masters of subtlety who take measured actions to manipulate an adversary without his knowledge. The dividing line between war and peace can be obscure. Low-level violence often is the backdrop to a larger strategic campaign. The unwitting victim, focused on the day-to-day events, never realizes what's happening to him until it's too late. History holds many examples. The Viet Cong lured French and U.S. infantry deep into the jungle, weakening their morale over several years. The mobile army of the United States was designed to fight on the plains of Europe, where it could quickly move unhindered from one spot to the next. The jungle did more than make quick movement impossible; broken down into smaller units and scattered in isolated bases, US forces were deprived of the feeling of support and protection that ordinarily comes from being part of a big army. The isolation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was not just a logistical detail, something that could be overcome by, for instance, bringing in reinforcements by helicopter. In a big army reinforcements are readily available. It was Napoleon who realized the extraordinary effects on morale that come from being part of a larger formation. Just the knowledge of it lowers the soldier's fear and increases his aggressiveness. In the jungle and on isolated bases, this feeling was removed. The thick vegetation slowed down the reinforcements and made it difficult to find stranded units. Soldiers felt they were on their own. More important, by altering the way the war was fought, the Viet Cong stripped the United States of its belief in the inevitability of victory, as it had done to the French before them. Morale was high when these armies first went to Vietnam. Only after many years of debilitating and demoralizing fighting did Hanoi launch its decisive attacks, at Dienbienphu in 1954 and against Saigon in 1975. It should be recalled that in the final push to victory the North Vietnamese abandoned their jungle guerrilla tactics completely, committing their entire army of twenty divisions to pushing the South Vietnamese into collapse. This final battle, with the enemy's army all in one place, was the one that the United States had desperately wanted to fight in 1965. When it did come out into the open in 1975, Washington had already withdrawn its forces and there was no possibility of re-intervention. The Japanese early in World War II used a modern form of the indirect attack, one that relied on stealth and surprise for its effect. At Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia, stealth and surprise were attained by sailing under radio silence so that the navy's movements could not be tracked. Moving troops aboard ships into Southeast Asia made it appear that the Japanese army was also "invisible." Attacks against Hawaii and Singapore seemed, to the American and British defenders, to come from nowhere. In Indonesia and the Philippines the Japanese attack was even faster than the German blitz against France in the West. The greatest military surprises in American history have all been in Asia. Surely there is something going on here beyond the purely technical difficulties of detecting enemy movements. Pearl Harbor, the Chinese intervention in Korea, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam all came out of a tradition of surprise and stealth. U.S. technical intelligence – the location of enemy units and their movements was greatly improved after each surprise, but with no noticeable improvement in the American ability to foresee or prepare what would happen next. There is a cultural divide here, not just a technical one. Even when it was possible to track an army with intelligence satellites, as when Iraq invaded Kuwait or when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, surprise was achieved. The United States was stunned by Iraq's attack on Kuwait even though it had satellite pictures of Iraqi troops massing at the border. The exception that proves the point that cultural differences obscure the West's understanding of Asian behavior was the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. This was fully anticipated and understood in advance. There was no surprise because the United States understood Moscow's worldview and thinking. It could anticipate Soviet action almost as well as the Soviets themselves, because the Soviet Union was really a Western country. The difference between the Eastern and the Western way of war is striking. The West's great strategic writer, Clausewitz, linked war to politics, as did Sun-tzu. Both were opponents of militarism, of turning war over to the generals. But there all similarity ends. Clausewitz wrote that the way to achieve a larger political purpose is through destruction of the enemy's army. After observing Napoleon conquer Europe by smashing enemy armies to bits, Clausewitz made his famous remark in On War (1932) that combat is the continuation of politics by violent means. Morale and unity are important, but they should be harnessed for the ultimate battle. If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all. In this view, war proceeds along a fixed course and occupies a finite extent of time, like a play in three acts with a beginning, a middle, and an end. The end, the final scene, decides the issue for good. When things don't work out quite this way, the Western military mind feels tremendous frustration. Sun-tzu's great disciples, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, are respected in Asia for their clever use of indirection and deception to achieve an advantage over stronger adversaries. But in the West their approach is seen as underhanded and devious. To the American strategic mind, the Viet Cong guerrilla did not fight fairly. He should have come out into the open and fought like a man, instead of hiding in the jungle and sneaking around like a cat in the night. According to the author, the main reason for the U.S. losing the Vietnam war was
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MCQ->Statements: My first and foremost task is to beautify this city - if city X and Y can do it - why can't we do it. - Statement of Municipal Commissioner of city Z after taking over charge. Conclusions: The people of city Z are not aware about the present state of ugliness of their city. The present Commissioner has worked in city X and Y and has good experience of beautifying cities.

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MCQ->My first and foremost task is to beautify this city if City ‘X’ and ‘Y’ can do it why can’t we do it Statement of Municipal Commissioner of City ‘Z’ after taking over charge Conclusions: I.The people of city Z are not aware about the present state of ugliness of their city. II.The present Commissioner has worked in City X and Y and has good experience of beautifying cities....